Young farmers’ opportunity to enter and maintain farming through tenancy : a multiple case study in Southern Sweden by Lundberg, Anna & Persson, Emelie
 Independent project for master’s degree • 30 hec • Advanced level 
Agricultural Programme –Economics and Management 
Degree thesis No 1180 • ISSN 1401-4084 
Uppsala • 2018 
Young farmers’ opportunity to enter and 
maintain farming through tenancy  
- A multiple case study in southern Sweden  
 
 
Anna Lundberg 
Emelie Persson 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
  
 
Young farmers' opportunity to enter and maintain farming through tenancy   
- A multiple case study in southern Sweden  
 
Anna Lundberg 
Emelie Persson 
 
 
Supervisor: Hans Andersson, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
 Department of Economics 
 
 
Examiner: Richard Fergusson, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
 Department of Economics 
 
 
Credits:  30 hec 
Level: A2E  
Course title: Independent project in business administration 
Course code: EX0807  
Programme/Education: Agricultural programme – Economics and management  
Faculty: Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences 
 
Place of publication: Uppsala 
Year of publication: 2018 
Cover picture: [Anna Lundberg] 
Name of Series: Degree project/SLU, Department of Economics 
No: 1180 
ISSN 1401-4084 
Online publication: http://stud.epsilon.slu.se 
 
Key words: Tenancy, Young farmers, Relationship, Entering, Contract, External actor, 
Agreement, Arrangement, Stakeholder, Principal-agent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sveriges lantbruksuniversit 
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
Fakulteten för naturresurser och jordbruksvetenskap 
Institutionen för ekonomi
 iii 
Acknowledgements  
 
 
This thesis has been a great journey for us and we have gathered better knowledge and 
understanding for young farmer´s opportunities to create a successful business through 
tenancy. We are very grateful that we have been given the opportunity to meet inspiring and 
driven young farmers and external factors that have provided us with interesting experiences 
and insight to our study. Therefore, we would like to show gratitude to all participated 
farmers, landowners, consulting firm and bank for valuable interviews.  
 
We would like to thank Skånes arrendatorsförening and LRF Ungdomen for providing us 
contact information for possible respondents to young farmers. Furthermore, we would also 
like to thank our supervisor Hans Andersson for great support of valuable knowledge and 
experiences concerning the thesis. We would also like to show our gratitude to Annie Möller, 
Georg Eriksson, family and friends at SLU for valuable feedback during the writing process.  
 
Finally, we would like to thank our fantastic classmates for five wonderful years together, 
without them these years would not have been the same.  
 
Uppsala, June 2018 
 
 
 
 
_______________________         _______________________   
 
Anna Lundberg     Emelie Persson 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
  
Abstract  
 
The agricultural sector is capital intensive compared with other industries and the conditions 
for managing a farm have changed during the recent decades. During the past few years, the 
price of farmland and rental rates have increased which results in difficulties to maintain a 
stable and profitable business. Furthermore, the average age of farmers in Sweden is 58 years 
old and the number of retired farmers will increase in the future. Right timing of transferring 
the farm’s to the next generation has a significant impact on the business development and 
future profitability and therefore it is necessary to consider the problem with the increasing 
age. Young farmers tend to have more tenancy agreements and less owned arable land. This is 
because young farmers do not have any other option than enter tenancy agreements since they 
usually do not have sufficient capital, or the income will not be good enough to meet the 
financing payments. This study focuses on to connect the principal-agent theory and the 
stakeholder theory to the problem concerning young farmers’ opportunity to enter and 
maintain farming through tenancy. The aim of the study is to increase the understanding of 
young farmers’ opportunities to enter and maintain farming through tenancy agreements, by 
analyzing the importance of a relationship between a landowner and a tenant and significant 
external actors. Additionally, the relevance of the relationship between the tenant and their 
external actors is examined. 
 
The study applies a qualitative research approach with a multiple case study design and which 
entails twelve respondents. Eight of these twelve respondents are young farmers. The other 
four respondents are external actors within the agricultural sector that might have an impact 
on the young farmers’ possibility to develop their farm business. The empirical data has been 
analyzed through the theoretical framework, which entails the principal-agent theory and the 
stakeholder theory. The results of the study indicate that young farmers have difficulties to 
enter and maintain farming through tenancy agreements. Although, good relationships with 
landowners and other external parties are the most important aspects for a tenant farmer to 
observe. Young farmers usually face more difficult financial conditions and therefore good 
relationships, reputation and different unique experiences are essential for the possibility to 
enter farming through tenancy. 
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Sammanfattning  
 
Lantbruk är en kapitalintensiv näring och förutsättningarna för att bedriva 
lantbruksverksamhet är under ständig förändring. Under de senaste åren har åkermarks- och 
arrendepriserna ökat vilket har orsakat svårigheter att skapa en stabil och lönsam verksamhet. 
Den genomsnittliga lantbrukaren i Sverige är 58 år och antalet pensionerade lantbrukare 
kommer att öka dramatiskt i framtiden. Det är av väsentlig betydelse att göra 
generationsskiften vid rätt tidpunkt eftersom det har en stor inverkan på verksamhetens 
utveckling och framtida lönsamhet.  
 
Unga lantbrukare tenderar att bruka mer arrenderad än ägd åkermark. Många unga 
lantbrukare har inte några andra alternativ eftersom de inte har tillräckligt med eget kapital för 
att köpa åkermark. Intäkterna från lantbruket är heller inte tillräckliga för att täcka de 
finansiella kostnaderna och amorteringarna av gårdslånen. Denna studie fokuserar på att 
sammankoppla principal-agent teorin och intressentteori till problemet gällande unga 
lantbrukares möjlighet att etablera och bedriva jordbruk genom arrende. Syftet med denna 
studie är att öka förståelsen för unga lantbrukares möjlighet att etablera och bedriva en 
lantbruksverksamhet via arrende. Detta genom att analysera betydelsen av relationen mellan 
markägare och arrendatorer samt viktiga externa aktörer.  
 
Studien tillämpar en kvalitativ forskningsmetod med flera fallstudier. Totalt har tolv 
respondenter intervjuats varav åtta av dessa är unga lantbrukare. De resterande fyra 
respondenterna är externa aktörer inom jordbrukssektorn som kan ha stor påverkan och 
betydelse för de unga lantbrukarnas möjligheter att utveckla sin verksamhet. Den empiriska 
datan har analyserats genom den teoretiska syntesen som är principal-agent teori och 
intressentteori. Resultatet av studien visar att unga lantbrukare har stora svårigheter att 
etablera lantbruksverksamheter genom arrenden. Däremot är goda relationer med markägare 
och andra externa aktörer inom den agrara näringen en av de viktigaste aspekterna för en 
arrendator att observera. Unga lantbrukare möter vanligtvis mer problematiska förutsättningar 
vid etablering av arrende. Därför är det av avgörande betydelse för dem att skapa goda 
relationer, gott rykte och olika unika erfarenheter för att få möjligheten att etablera en 
lantbruksverksamhet genom arrende.  
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1 Introduction 
In this section, the thesis problem background is presented. Additionally, the research aim 
and questions are highlighted, followed by delimitations and thesis structure.  
 
1.1 Problem background 
 
The agricultural and food industry is still considered to be one of the most important 
industries in Sweden (Johansson et al., 2014). Furthermore, the agriculture has become an 
important political matter, and it has also gained more interest from consumers and society 
(Rivera-Ferre, 2008). Although, there is a need for further knowledge in the agricultural 
sector in order to achieve a more sustainable production system since it is a complex industry.  
 
The traditional farm business is capital intensive compared with other industries (Johansson et 
al., 2014). The reason the agricultural sector is capital intensive is mainly because of 
substandard investments in buildings and machinery. Additionally, the price changes within 
the sector vary since they depend on the world market economy (Wåhlstedt, 1987). The price 
fluctuations create uncertainties concerning the planning and decision-making of the farm 
business. Companies with significant holdings of long-term assets seem to have more 
difficulties, which is typical within the agricultural sector. 
 
Since Sweden in 1995 became a member of the European Union (EU) the conditions for 
managing a farm changed (Johansson et al., 2014). One reason is because the price of 
farmland has increased since the entry in EU (Enhäll, 2017). The development of farmland 
prices is linked to agricultural policy provisions and intervention where the most fundamental 
reason is related to the implementation of area-support payments. The increased farmland 
prices have caused difficulties in developing a stable and profitable business. The price of 
farmland differs in Sweden and depends mainly on the fertility of soil (Helin, 2017). One of 
the most fertilized soils is located in Scania in southern Sweden. The average price for 
farmland in 2017 was 138 000 Swedish crowns per hectares and has increased by 10 % since 
2016. Although, the price of farmland during the last year has decreased with 3 % which can 
be explained by lower profitability within the sector. Additionally, the average rental rate for 
farmland has increased by almost 50 % but during the past five years the price has leveled off 
(Enhäll, 2017). 
 
Farmers have to make more well- reasoned decisions and with strategic planning in order to 
operate a sustainable business (Errington & Nolan, 1998; Öhlmér et al., 1998). The timing of 
the farm's transfer to the next generation has an effect on the farm's future profitability. 
Usually, farmers have already experienced a decline in productivity when they consider 
transferring their estate to the next generation, and in general, farmers are most efficient 
during the age of 30-40 years (Kimhi, 1994). The decision for the next generation of farmers 
whether to enter into farming by purchase farmland or leasing depends on the occasion and 
the life situation.   
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The average age of farmers in Sweden is 58 years (Karlsson, 2018). Additionally, over 30 % 
of all the Swedish farmers are 64 years or older (www, SCB, 2017). The average age of the 
Swedish population will rise dramatically in the next few years, mainly due to a large number 
of children being born in the 1940’s. These circumstances will increase the number of retired 
people in the future (www, Boverket, 2016). The right timing of transferring a farm to the 
next generation has a significant effect on the farm business development, and therefore it is 
necessary to consider that. 
Statistics from LRF Konsult indicate that the average age for landowners that sell farmland is 
67 years old and, on the other hand, the average age for those who purchase farmland is 50 
years old (Helin, 2017). In Sweden, the proportion of farmland tenancies was 38 % in 2016 of 
the total amount of farmland which has been consistent over decades (Grönvall, 2017). The 
older farmer tends to own more farmland instead of leasing farmland (www, Jordbruksverket, 
2014). According to the table 1, farmers under the age of 25 operate 68 % farm tenancy out of 
their total use of farmland whereas farmers 65 years or older have 28 % farm tenancy. Hence, 
younger farmers operate more rented land and less owned arable land. 
1.2 Problem statement 
As argued in the problem background it is necessary for farmers to transfer their property to 
the next generation at some point, though it can be difficult (Bradshaw et al., 2016). One 
major problem is that arable land is expensive and requires a significant capital investment, 
especially for young farmers (Stoneberg, 2017). In this study, a young farmer is defined under 
the age of 40 years old, which is based on EU enterprise support for young established 
farmers (www, Jordbruksverket, 2018). 
Usually, young farmers do not have an option to purchase arable land since they do not have 
sufficient capital for the investment (Stoneberg, 2017). Especially, concerning the limited 
possibilities to obtain credit from the bank without any collateral (Stoneberg, 2017; Wästfelt, 
2014). Additionally, without other previous conditions, it may also be difficult to enter 
through tenancy (Wästfelt, 2014). However, if the farmer does not have the opportunity to 
Table 1: Distribution of tenant and owned farmland based on the farmers’ age (%) 
(Jordbruksverket, 2014; own modification). 
Table 1:  Distributio  of te ant and owned farmlan based on th  farmers’ age (%) 
(Jordbruksverket, 2014; own modification). 
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purchase farmland, tenancy agreement may be a solution to enter a farm business without 
significant investments. Although, a tenancy agreement can be unsecured regarding the 
investment and development of the business from a long-term perspective. The reason is that 
it is hard to take advantage of the farmlands full potential since the contract might be 
terminated and with no possibilities to be part of any land price appreiation.  
As previously stated, young farmers face problem to enter farming through tenancy. This 
circumstance is mainly due to a capital intensive sector, the difficulties with achieving credits 
from the bank without any security and, that older farmers usually keep the property for a 
longer period (Stoneberg, 2017). Previous research has explored the importance of the 
relationship between a tenant and a landowner, regarding the contract arrangement from an 
international perspective (Huffman & Just, 2004; Grubbström & Erikssson, 2018). 
Furthermore, the study shows that there are different types of risks in a tenancy relationship. 
Although, to the best of our knowledge there is no previous study in the Swedish perspective 
concerning the importance of the tenant's relationship to the landowner. This problem can be 
seen as gap-spotting which implies a lack of knowledge in the research field. Because of the 
difficulties for young farmers to enter farming through tenancy this study focus on analyzing 
the relationship between the landowner and the tenant and the impact of the external 
environment. Therefore it is of interest to examine if the relationships between landowner and 
tenant may be a key factor for young farmers to achieve a tenancy agreement. 
1.3 Aim and research questions 
The aim of the study is to increase the understanding of young farmers' opportunities to enter 
and maintain farming through tenancy agreements, by analyzing the importance of a 
relationship between a landowner and a tenant. Additionally, the relevance of the relationship 
between the tenant and their external actors is examined. Based on the aim of the study 
following research questions were formed.   
Research questions: 
• How does the relationship to the landowners influence the young farmer's opportunity
to enter and maintain a tenancy agreement?
• How do the external actors affect young tenant farmers’ business conditions within the
agricultural sector?
1.4 Delimitations 
This thesis focus on young farmers’ opportunity to enter farming through tenancy where 
insights from both young farmers and external actors within the agricultural sector are 
analyzed. The chosen respondents of young farmers are younger than 40 years old in order to 
be categorized as a young farmer in this study. Furthermore, all farmers within the study have 
entered their business through a tenancy agreement, and most of them have remained in these 
agreements as a dominant part of their business strategy.  
The selection of external actors is based on their relevance to farmers’ possibilities to enter 
farming through are tenancy. In this study private landowner, institutional landowner, bank, 
and tenancy specialist chosen for the study. A high density of tenancy motivates the chosen 
geographical location in southern Sweden and with one of the highest rental rate in Sweden. 
Because of the delimitations and chosen approach in the study, the results may not be 
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generalized to every young farmer's opportunity to enter farming through a tenancy 
agreement in Sweden. The reason is because there might be different opportunities for a 
young farmer to enter a tenancy agreement depending on for example previous experiences. 
1.5 Structure of the report 
 
Chapter one (1) contains a problem background, problem statement within the subject area. 
Additionally, the chapter also includes the aim of the study, research questions, and 
delimitations. The literature review of previous research in the field is presented in chapter 
two (2). The choice of theoretical framework and relevance to the study is described in 
chapter three (3). In chapter four (4) are the research approach and the design of the study 
presented. Furthermore, the chapter also includes a description of the process concerning data 
collection, presentation of the data, analysis and ethical considerations. The interviewed 
respondents and the results of the study are presented in chapter five (5). Chapter six (6) 
contains analysis and discussion of the theoretical framework and empirical findings. The 
conclusions and future research are presented in chapter seven (7). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Structure of the report. Own modification 
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2 Literature review 
 
The literature review includes an introduction of the Swedish tenancy legislation and previous 
research with tenancy agreements in the agricultural sector. This chapter aims to develop a 
better understanding of the current knowledge gap in the research field. See overview for the 
literature review in appendix 3.  
2.1 Agricultural tenancy within the Swedish context 
 
A farmer can have own agricultural land, be a tenant or combine these two (Andersson, 
2014). In most countries it is common to enter farming through tenancy since it is less capital 
intensive. The structure of a tenancy agreement has an essential function for establishing and 
developing an agricultural business. A tenancy agreement entails a price risk since the tenant 
must control the product prices and the crop yield. Therefore it is neccesary to be flexible in 
order to handle the price fluctuations for the products that is produced (Pålsson, 2014). A 
tenant is not a part of the price development of the farmland and has, therefore, difficulties to 
have a long-term planning. This is compared to own property where you are directly a part of 
the price development. Furthermore, figure 2 illustrates different risks that can occur for a 
landowner whether they cultivate their own land or have a tenant that cultivate their farmland 
(Andersson, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 2:  Different risks for a landowner and a tenant (Andersson, 2014; own modification). 
The Swedish legislation defines tenancy as an agreement for the use of land with 
compensation (Bäärnhielm, 2014). All tenancy that is classified for agrarian use is categorized 
as an agricultural tenancy (9 chaps. 1§ Code of Land Laws1). According to the Swedish 
legislation the compensation for the use of farmland has to be determined in monetary terms 
in order to be a tenancy agreement (9 chaps. 29§ Code of Land Laws).  
 
There are two different types of tenancy agreement for an agricultural property in the Code of 
Land Laws, which are farm tenancy and side tenancy (Svensson, 1997). The farm tenancy and 
the side tenancy are described in the 9 chap. 2§ and 7§ in the code of Land laws. If a tenancy 
arrangement for a specific period includes housing for the tenant, it is a farm tenancy, and the 
term of the leasehold should be minimum five years for the tenant. The side tenancy, on the 
other hand is constructed as farm tenancy without housing for the tenant farmer included in 
the tenancy agreement.   
 
                                                 
1 The code of Land laws: The Swedish legislation for tenancy agreement (Jordabalk, 1970). 
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The tenancy arrangement has different legal implications concerning the duration of the 
contract and thereby protection of the tenant. Axelsson (2014) describes that a protected 
tenancy gives the tenant the right to an extension of the tenancy agreement even if the 
landowner has given notice, besides a few exceptions. The legislation for the protected 
tenancy are mandatory rules and refer to farm tenancy and side tenancy, with the requirement 
that the contract are beyond a year. If there are any disputes in the relationship between a 
landowner and a tenant, it is possible to recieve support from a tenancy tribunal. It is an 
administrative authority and is the first level of investigation if a dispute occurs.  
 
2.2 Contracts arrangements for farm businesses 
 
Young farmers have different opportunities to enter farming and thereby have to decide 
whether to purchase or lease farmland (Grubbström & Erikssson, 2018). Although, the 
number of sold properties is not as common as for leased farmland and therefore could it be 
difficult to purchase farmland. One reason for fewer available properties on the market might 
be due to personal relationships at the current farm. Tenancy agreement might be an 
opportunity for former farmers who want to keep the property within the family and thereby 
later on be able to decide future plans.  
 
It is necessary to obtain an in-depth understanding of farmers’ underlying reasons and 
decisions for how they have entered the farming business (Pietola & Lansink, 2001; see 
Hanson et al., 2012). Psychological concepts influence farmers decisions for their activities in 
the farm business (Hansson et al., 2012). Agricultural companies may combine their business 
with other activities and thereby generate extra income (Carter, 1998). For example, the 
farmer may choose to diversify their crop production and to expand the livestock production, 
or enlarge in external contracting activities. Another crucial factor in order to be able to 
expand a farm business, is to have access to property assets in form of farmland. This can be 
essential for future strategic developments.  
 
Reiss (1960), argues that newly established farmers have to compete with growing farms. 
Newly established farmers face more difficult circumstances, especially those who have 
limited possibilities to obtain financial support from their families or external eniviroment. 
Although, a good start might be to enter farming gradually by tenancy arrangements. 
However, one of the main factors that are considered to affect the opportunity to purchase 
farmland or entry a tenancy is the possibility to access credit from the bank (Deininger & 
Feder, 2001). Thereby, the bank has a significant influence whether young farmers have the 
opportunity to enter farming in the agricultural sector. Usually, ownership of some arable land 
facilitate the opportunity for the farmer to access credit.  
 
From a historical perspective, the relationship between farmers and the social environment 
has been necessary for the land tenure, as well as availability of capital (Blaikie & Brookfield, 
1987). Landowners and farmers may have different types of relationship (Grossman, 1992). 
Depending on the frame of the contract, the parties may form a landlord-tenant relationship, 
an employer- employee relationship or a partnership.  
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The landowners behavior usally depend on their own experience and personality (Amis, 
1984). Some landowners are more sympathetic towards different situations, while others are 
more insensitive in a contract relationship. There is no clear explanation why these 
differences occur. Furthermore, there is limited evidence that a larger landowner would be 
more formal than smaller landowners. However, smaller landowners may develop a closer 
relationship to the tenant. 
Fraser (2004), emphasizes that farmers who own land make more long-term strategic 
decisions compared to farmers with tenancy agreements. Furthermore, it is argued that there 
is no guarantee that tenants will keep long-term benefits from the land unless they apply good 
managerial strategies to maximize their short-term profits. Long-term agrements, on the other 
hand are more similar to owning property.   
Landowners and tenants that have series of contracts over time with each other enable 
collection of information based on their previous performance in the arrangement (Allen & 
Lueck, 2002). By using past performance to develop standard contracts, it might generate 
incorrect incentives in the long-term perspective between the contracting parties. Those 
farmers who have little information to display concerning performance in the past are usually 
offered contracts based on low expectations of output. Meanwhile, those farmers who have 
performed well in the past and provide information of their knowledge will be offered deals 
with high future standards.   
8 
 
3 Theoretical framework 
Chapter three contains the theoretical framework for this study. The chapter includes the 
principal-agent theory and the stakeholder theory. Thereafter are alternative theories 
discussed to motivate the chosen theories. Finally, presents a description of the linkages 
between the chosen theories.  
3.1 The principal-agent theory 
 
At the beginning of the 1970’s economists studied the risk sharing by individuals and groups 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). It was discovered that risk sharing emerges when collaborating parties 
have different views of risk. A broader perspective of the risk sharing mechanism is the 
principal-agent problem, which defines the relationship between the principal and the agent.   
The principal-agent theory is based on the problems concerning separation of ownership and 
controllability (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). The problems are connected to the relationship 
between the principal and the agent, which occurs when one part, labeled agent acts on behalf 
of another part, called principal (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2014; Royer, 1999). Usually, the 
principal owns an asset and therefore employs an agent in order to increase the value of it. 
The principal is the one who delegates the commission to the agent, whereby the agent is the 
one who performs the commission (Eisenhardt, 1989). If the agent has different interests and 
goals compared to the principal, it will affect the agent’s response, which might not 
correspond to the principal’s expectations. The arrangement between the principal and the 
agent is generally defined in a contract, which specifies the agreement between the parties 
(Royer, 1999). A contract can be explicit, where the terms are written and legally enforced, or 
it can be implicit, where the terms usually are understood and enforced by reputation effects. 
The principal-agent relationship can, for example, be related to employer and employees or as 
in this thesis landowner and tenant (Eisenhardt, 1989). Whereby the landowner is the 
principal and the tenant is the agent.     
There are two criteria that have to be achieved before a principal-agent problem can occur 
(Groenewegen et al., 2010). The first criteria concern the differences in interests in the 
relationship between the principal and the agent. The principal wants to maximize the utility 
and therefore requires that the agent does the best to accomplish this. The second criteria are 
asymmetric information, which refers to the fact that the principal does not have full 
information about the agent. In many cases, the agent will have the opportunity to hide their 
characteristics and information before the contract is completed. The agent can also hide 
actions and decisions after the agreement has been signed. One possible solution to the 
problem of asymmetric information is that the principal can monitor the agent actions in the 
relationship between the principal and the agent for each part. This might be complicated or 
expensive for the principal. Therefore, the agent usually continues to have informational 
advantageous (Eisenhardt, 1989). Problems within the principal-agent theory related to 
diverse objectives could be eliminated in case that the principal and the agent could agree on a 
contract that would require the agent to act in the interests of the principal (Royer, 1999). 
Usually, contracts are incomplete which enables shirking because of imperfect observability. 
As a result, the main focus of the principal-agent theory is incentives and measurement.  
If the criteria have been accomplished, it will cause either ex-ante opportunism or ex-post 
opportunism in the contract agreement (Groenewegen et al., 2010). Ex-ante opportunism 
occurs when there is a lack of information before the contract has been signed and this could 
then lead to what is labeled adverse selection. Ex-post opportunism is when a part does not 
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fulfill the agreement as expected without the other part being aware of the deviation from the 
agreement. This could result in what is called moral hazard. An illustration of the relationship 
between the landowner and the tenant are presented in a principal-agent model in figure 3.  
Figure 3: The Principal-Agent model (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009; own modification). 
The principal in a principal-agent relationship can never have full control over the agent, 
either before or after the contract has been signed (Fraser, 2015; Arrow, 1963). When the 
principal-agent theory leads to the different opportunism, the approach has the focus for the 
agreed commitments between the principal and the agent (Fraser, 2015).  
In the context of a tenancy agreement, a landowner and a tenant can be compared with a 
policy design where it refers to ex-ante problem adverse selection and ex-post problem moral 
hazard (Groenewegen et al., 2010). These problems are related to information asymmetry and 
behavior of each part in the principal-agent theory.  
Adverse selection 
Adverse selection develops through information asymmetry before signing the contract 
between the two parties in a contract relationship (Groenewegen et al., 2010). It usually 
occurs under the circumstances when one party has hidden information and gets information 
advantages (Groenewegen et al., 2010; Royer, 1999). This information may relate to different 
preferences and risk that could be relevant to the contract agreement (Royer, 1999). If there is 
heterogeneity between the principal and the agent, they may prefer to behave according to 
their preferences (Fraser, 2015). Since the principal and the agent have different attitudes 
towards risk, the outcome of the agreement relationship can vary (Saam, 2007).  
The view of principal-agent problems for the area of adverse selection has an obvious 
relationship with the insurance market (Groenewegen et al., 2010). A vital issue for insurance 
companies is to separate offers for clients that are identified by risk levels. In the beginning, 
when an insurance company offers insurance premiums and hardly knows anything about the 
client, the incentives to provide insurance is the same for every company. 
In this case, the client, for example, never takes any risks if they think that the charge is too 
high. On the other hand, a high-risk client can take advantages of this (Groenewegen et al., 
2010). A solution to this problem may be to increase the premium for the high-risk clients for 
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the upcoming year. Furthermore, adverse selection problems may develop into welfare losses. 
Some evidence in the information even statistics show that younger clients are more in the 
risk zone for accidents, and on the other side older clients are categorized for low-risk clients. 
Another recourse for the problem can be to offer different solutions with both high and low-
risk premium and for the lower risk with an additional risk premium. Adverse selection can be 
analyzed in any market where a transaction of contracts has been signed together with some 
form of asymmetric information that involves different levels of risk or quality of operation.   
 
  Moral hazard 
 
Moral hazard problems may be characterized as ex-post opportunism after a contract has been 
signed (Groenewegen et al., 2010). When a new business relationship start and after the 
contract has been signed, may the principal change behavior. This situation can benefit the 
agent more due to the fact that they might be more oriented about the efforts. The reason is 
that the agent might be more prone to maximize the wealth of the situation than the principal. 
The effort might be unobservable, and the agent is limiting the risks of being victimized. The 
case is a kind of moral hazard as a result of opportunistic behavior. Moral Hazard may occur 
during different circumstances in situations where parties act in ways that are hard to verify, 
and will therefore not be mentioned in the contract (Royer, 1999).  
 
Situations that include the risk that the agent may behave opportunistically can affect the 
efficiency of the contract agreement (Groenewegen et al., 2010). The principal as a landowner 
might have a lack of information concerning the current contract relationship. The moral 
hazard problem can emerge in the process when a tenant as an agent in the contract 
relationship obtains more knowledge than the landowner as the principal. More specifically, 
after a contract is signed, the agent might have the desire to perform. The risk here is that they 
might pretend to work and use the rented land in a certain way and then act in another (Saam, 
2007). Those are called "the hidden actions" and are hard for the principal to keep track of in 
a longer time.   
 
Moral hazard occurs when a principal has a lack of information about the dealing partner in 
the relationship (Saam, 2007). The lack of information exchange often occurs after the 
contract has been signed, and the moral hazard develops when the information advantages are 
clear, and the other party uses the situation.  
 
Moral hazard is widespread in the insurance literature, but could also be found in other sectors 
(Groenewegen et al., 2010). It is common in the market for personal and individual firms 
when the part from one perspective decides over a contract to act in the first party's best 
interests. It is always hard to know if each party works most efficiently to fulfill the desired 
goals. An arrangement for the principals is to minimize the risk of the moral hazard problem 
is to evaluate the agent's performance once in a while (Holmström, 1982).  
 
 Information asymmetry 
 
The principal and the agent can develop informational asymmetry which may effect the 
relationship (Saam, 2007). The principal-agent problem is based on the power the agent has in 
relation to the principal. Usually, the principal-agent problem can be solved through power 
phenomenon, which is based on that either of the principal or agents adjust personal beliefs, 
attitudes, and behavior as a result of their actions or the influence of others. An incomplete 
contract can be caused by asymmetric information (Royer, 1999). Asymmetric information 
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develops when there is no equal access to relevant information to sustain necessary 
contractual relationships. This hidden information creates an unbalanced situation in the 
relationship, which could lead to incorrect transactions and in some cases even market failure 
(Wilson, 2008). The information asymmetry failure is most common in the principal-agent 
relationship where misinformation can occur between the parties due to different processes of 
communication (Royer, 1999)  
The main problem for the customer is information asymmetry or the inability to determine the 
quality of the transaction in the relationship (Mishra et al., 1998). The inability to confirm the 
quality creates two different outcomes of supplier opportunism that is (1) incorrect application 
of honest and (2) actual awareness of quality cheating. These problems describe adverse 
selection, and moral hazard with can occur between the parites.   
Transaction costs 
A transaction cost might develop because of changes to organizing and performance in a 
contract relationship (Royer, 1999). Transaction cost includes costs in the form of negotiating 
and enforcing contracts. Furthermore, the costs arise when one or more parties have the 
opportunity to behave opportunistically within the transaction in order to achieve a private 
gain at the expense of the common good. The transaction costs include both the costs related 
to the adverse consequences of opportunistic behavior and the costs of trying to prevent it 
from occurring between the parties.  
Contracts serve an important role to mitigate transaction costs (Royer, 1999). The reason is 
because  the existence of a contract enables the involved parties to fulfill their obligations. 
This can be made by protecting the parties from opportunistic behavior and therefore 
decreases the risk of transaction costs. Though are not all contracts automatically equally 
effective to avoid transaction costs. A contracts possibility to facilitate the parties’ obligations 
depends on the completeness of the contract and the relevance of the contract legislation. A 
complete contract decreases the risk of transaction costs, this by representing both party’s 
rights and responsibilities for every possible situation that can arise within the transaction. In 
order to design a complete contract, it is necessary that all involved parties in the contract 
relationship are able to anticipate all possible situations and agree on all arrangements that 
everyone has to take in response. Furthermore, the parties have to be able to measure 
performance and agree on their satisfactory performance. 
Portfolio problem 
The portfolio problem can be viewed as an equity purchase problem when matching personal 
risk preferences in a principal-agent relationship (Cook, 1995). The problem is usually viewed 
from the perspective of a cooperative business where the members in the cooperative have 
invested capital and that they have to accept a higher level of risks than preferable. From this, 
they cannot diversify individual risk preferences that have a correlation to their personal 
wealth (Royer, 1999). Given the presence of risks, it is valuable to spread the assets into 
different operations (Nilsson, 2001). The risk in such relationship as in the principal- agent 
theory can be reduced effectively with a well-planned investment portfolio (Andersson, 
2014). The investment decisions regarding risky assets are independent of the financial 
parameters risk preferences and the level of wealth (Markowitz, 1952). It is individually if the 
agent defines the principal-agent relationship as a capital investment. Necessarily it will be to 
optimize the portfolio with the financial investments concerning the agent's risk references 
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(Borgen, 2004; Nilsson, 2001). This can lead to conflicts and even economic losses (Nilsson, 
2001; Cook, 1995).  
 
 Horizon problem 
 
A rational investor intends to maximize their own portfolio of financial investments with 
consideration of risk- and reward preferences for each party in the relationship (Borgen, 
2004). The horizon problem occurs when investors state that the net cash flow caused by an 
asset is predicted to terminate before the end of the assets useful life (Royer, 1999). Hence, 
actors face a limited planning horizon (Nilsson, 2001). The actors are, therefore, more likely 
to under-invest in the asset since the return they receive is less than the return generated by 
the asset (Ortmann & King, 2007; Royer, 1999). A consequence of the horizon problem for an 
agent is that it develops into an investment disincentive for actors to contribute to growth 
opportunities (Cook, 1995). The reason is that the return to the investor is lower compared to 
the return generated by the asset (Royer, 1999).   
 Hold- up problem 
 
In a contractual agreement, one party might abuse the inflexibility and vulnerability 
connected to the party who has made the most transaction related investment in the principal-
agent relationship (Groenewegen et al., 2010; Royer, 1999). This situation is a hold- up 
problem, and the one party might act opportunistically and use the position and reformulate 
the agreement in their way with increased bargaining power. This example is a kind of 
incomplete contract where there is a lack of trust, and this gives no guarantee of a sufficient 
return. The hold-up situation might result in additional transaction costs and can make 
negotiations concerning the contracts more difficult and cause more renegotiations (Royer, 
1999).  
3.2 The stakeholder theory  
 
The primary focus in stakeholder theory is to examine the corporation's roles and functions in 
a more in-depth and broader perspective (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). This approach might 
be useful for the firm to understand and satisfy their stakeholders and may be applied in any 
business, likely in a farm business. Furthermore, Wagner Mainardes et al., (2011) 
demonstrate the importance of creating an honest and truthful relationship with external actors 
within the business since they have an impact on the success of the business. Social capital is 
useful for the value and trust between people or organizations as in the stakeholder theory 
(Pretty, 2003). The benefits of social capital are attributable to the reduction of transaction 
costs between the involved parties’ due to trust between the parties to act as expected 
resulting in less monitoring (Pretty & Ward, 2001).  
The definition of a stakeholder is: "An individual or group of individuals who can affect or be 
affected by the achievement of organizational objectives" (Hannan & Freeman, 1984 p. 46). 
The view of the stakeholder theory has changed over the years. The idea was originally a help 
to understand the strategic planning and business requirements (Freeman, 2010). When a 
business can be understood in the relationship between stakeholders, they create value for 
each other. Each stakeholder plays an important role though specific stakeholders might be 
more valuable than others at certain times, and may, therefore, be seen as key stakeholder. At 
the same time, no stakeholders are left alone, so all stakeholders together create value.  
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Stakeholders have over the years developed to think and act in a more responsible and 
sustainable way and with an ethical perspective. An illustration of the tenant’s stakeholders in 
this thesis is presented in figure 4.  
Figure 4: The original stakeholder model in the young farmers perspective (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; own 
modification). 
Stakeholders affect different actions, and the stakeholder theory is designed to define the 
connection between individuals or certain business relationships (Smudde & Courtright, 
2011). The theory can mainly be described as how a stakeholder relationship works the best in 
a good managerial and organizational structure. The three questions that are asked in the 
theory are "how are stakeholders created?", "how can relationships with stakeholders be 
maintained?" and lastly "how can relationships with stakeholders be improved?" The model 
of the stakeholder theory is formulating how a corporation can be managed (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995).  
According to Clarkson (1995) in Wagner Mainardes et al., (2011) the theory of stakeholders 
includes three factors. The factors are "the organization", "the other actors" and lastly "the 
nature of the company-actor relationship". Furthermore, there are both primary and secondary 
stakeholder relationships. The primary variant is constructed with a more defined setting and 
of formal contracts. The secondary still defines relationships but is less formal. 
The different stakeholders increase the need to develop the processes and techniques to be 
able to improve the strategic management capability within the farm business organization 
(Freeman, 2010). Usually, there are three levels of processes to understand the relationship 
between organizations and their stakeholder. First, it is necessary to understand who the 
stakeholders are in the organization and what inputs they provide from a rational perspective. 
Second, it is important to understand how the process within the organization handles the 
relationship with the stakeholders and whether the processes are suitable for the rational 
"stakeholder map" within the organization. The last process relates to the relevance of 
understanding the set of transactions between the organization and their stakeholders. This 
investigates if the negotiations are coherent with the "stakeholder map" and the actions of the 
stakeholders. The organization is required to fulfill these three levels of analysis in order to 
obtain a deeper understanding of their relationship to the stakeholders.   
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Moreover, in the stakeholder theory, there are three different perspectives: descriptive, 
instrumental and normative (Wagner Mainardes et al., 2011). The descriptive perspective 
identifies and explains characteristics and organizational behavior of the organization’s 
stakeholders. An instrumental perspective is a tool, which aims to analyze how stakeholder 
management can be used in order to reach the organization's performance goals, where parts 
of the result are related to behavior. The instrumental perspective is primarily based on 
organizational perspectives like agency theory, transaction cost theory and corporate 
behavioral ethics. The normative perspective refers to moral premises where actors and 
organization should consider how they act and behave in order to satisfy the stakeholders.  
 
Furthermore, normative perspectives are based on both descriptive and instrumental 
dimensions and are therefore an important aspect. In this study, the definition of instrumental 
perspective within the stakeholder theory will be used. This because the researcher’s ambition 
is to investigate how the organization can achieve their goals through the stakeholders and 
correlate this perspective with principal-agent theory.  
3.3 Alternative theories 
 
The property right is an alternative theory that concludes a right of owning a share or an 
investment in property (Oxford, 2018). When you own a property, you have the right to use it, 
or for example receive income from it, or sell it further to another owner (Groenewegen et al., 
2010). In the property rights theory, differentiation can be made between all goods. Property 
rights can lead to conflicts when they are defined in an unclear way (Cook & Iliopoulos, 
1998). Those vaguely defined rights are categorized in five perspectives. The property rights 
can be viewed as allocations in the organizational society. For example, landowners or other 
owners of capital can be categorized as a group with control (Groenewegen et al., 2010). 
They have control over the rules of the game and affect on the laws and regulations. However, 
this study concentrates on the relationship between the landowner and the tenant, which does 
not primarily affect the existence of property rights. Therefore, the property rights theory is 
not suitable to use in this thesis.  
 
Decision-making theory is another alternative theory that can be described as an ongoing 
process where there is a possibility to evaluate alternatives to obtain the goal. The expected 
outcome of a certain act will enable the decision maker to choose the activities that are most 
likely to accomplish the goal (Harrison & Pelletier, 2000). The decision process usually 
begins with clarifying the goals and values followed by the evaluation of the advantage and 
disadvantage of the expected outcome (Öhlmér et al., 1998). Even the current situation is 
evaluated to determine whether it is necessary to make a change. The goal is affected by the 
current situation and might also be affected by the decision maker’s personal valuation and 
previous actions. This model assumes that the decision maker has discovered a problem and 
aimed to solve it. This theory is not relevant for this thesis since the main purpose is not to 
clarify the farmers’ problem and their interests to solve it. Instead, this study focuses on 
factors concerning the relationship between the principal and the agent and what determines 
the possibility to enter the agricultural sector through tenancy. 
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3.4 Description of the theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework in this study is constructed on the basis of the principal-agent 
theory and the stakeholder theory. The motivation for the chosen theories is to analyze the 
importance of the tenant’s relationship to the landowner and other related actors in their farm 
business. The analyzation of the different relationships in the theories will provide an 
understanding of young farmers ability to enter the agricultural sector through tenancy 
agreements. The basis of the principal-agent problem is a fundamental understanding of the 
relationship between the principals and the agent (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). Therefore, 
this theory is essential to examine the contextual understandingof the relationship between the 
landowner and the tenant. However, the principal assumes that the agent acts and makes 
decisions from the principal´s own interests in different situations. Although, the agent does 
not necessarily have to act in the best interest of the principal. The principal-agent problem 
arises when the parties display different risk preferences and goals, which lead to different 
self-interests. The principal-agent theory highlights that problems concerning the relationship 
between the parties could occur before and after the contract have been signed. The problems 
can arise due to hidden information and transaction costs. Therefore, emphasizes the theory to 
consider to promote risk sharing, long-term thinking and to avoid bargaining power in a 
relationship between a landowner and a tenant.   
To create a deeper perspective within the principal-agent relationship, the stakeholder theory 
is also suitable for this thesis. The stakeholder’s approach as the second theory focuses on the 
understanding and roles in a business relationship (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). The external 
actors as in the stakeholder theory affect the principal-agent relationship and the impact of 
success. The idea is to create more understanding of the strategic planning and create a 
valuable connection with the external actors. The instrumental view of the stakeholder theory 
is based on an organizational perspective. In the theory, the goal is to structure the 
management of the stakeholder with the reason to reach performance goals within the 
organization in the principal-agent relationship. These two theories complement each other 
concerning the relationship between the principal and the agent and other external actors in 
the stakeholder perspective, which is illustrated in figure 5. The theories are displayed in a 
view of the principal’s and the agent’s relationship. The tenant do not only have a relationship 
with the landowner. The tenant has several relationships with other business partners 
according to the stakeholder theory. Those actors are also important as in the relationship 
between the landowner and the tenant. 
Figure 5: A description of the theoretical framework of the thesis (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984; own modification). 
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4 Method 
 
Chapter four presents and motivates the selected research approach in order to achieve the 
aim of the study. The chapter also contains the procedure of developing the theoretical 
framework and empirical data. Furthermore, includes quality assurances, method critique 
and ethical considerations in the chapter.  
4.1 Research approach  
 
The research approach is about the style and the preferences for the concerned study (Robson, 
2011). The choice of research approach in a study depends on how the data will be collected 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). There are mainly two different research approaches: qualitative and 
quantitative. However, there is also a mixed approach that contains both qualitative and 
quantitative approach. A qualitative approach is generally based on non-numerical empirical 
data with the focus to reach a contextual understanding of the social atmosphere, which is the 
opposite of a quantitative approach (Robson & McCartan, 2016). In order to achieve the aim 
of this study and be able to answer the research questions, it is necessary to choose an 
approach that enables closer observations of individuals and thereby be able to gain a deeper 
understanding of the situation. In this study, the focus is on words instead of quantification in 
the data collection (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Furthermore, a study that contains a few cases or 
observations usually uses a qualitative approach (Robson, 2011). With the basis of this are 
therefore a qualitative approach chosen in this study. 
 
In the research process may a deductive and/or an inductive approach be applied (Bryman & 
Bell, 2015). A deductive approach is more commonly used in a quantitative method where the 
researcher analyzes the connection between the theory and in reality. The inductive approach 
instead focuses on how the empirical results can generate a new theory. In this study an 
inductive approach is applied even if it is based on already existed theories in another context 
than they originally were developed from (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Some researchers’ claim 
that this way of using an inductive approach is approved to be used since it is not necessary to 
generate a new theory. Instead, the approach may function as a theory examination given that 
the theory is selected before analyzing the data, which has been made in this study.  
 
Epistemology is about knowledge and how it appears (Bryman & Bell, 2015). It important 
that the researcher is well aware of the start position and how the research affects the image of 
the knowledge. This study is characterized by having an epistemology that focuses on the 
perspective of interpretivism. This perspective enables the researcher to observe phenomena 
in the form of social and cultural factors (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Furthermore, the perspective 
emphasizes the importance of understanding that the reality is discursive and constantly 
changing and that the researchers interpret in different ways.   
 
This research is based on a realistic ontology position, which implicates to see the reality but 
not with absolute certainty (Riege, 2003). A realistic perspective admits that there are  
differences between the real world and the problem that is observed in a study. This study 
contains a relevant reality and reflects on the relationships and network between the 
landowner and the tenant. By using a realistic position experience and relations are examined 
instead of confirming predetermined hypotheses. 
 
17 
It is important to be aware that a qualitative approach cannot be generalizable to the same 
extent as a quantitative approach (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The reason is that the small sample 
size does not generate a statistical foundation. Although, by using a multiple case study there 
might be a possibility to make some analytical and theoretical generalization (Robson, 2011). 
Furthermore, a qualitative research increases the risk that the data collection is affected by the 
researcher’s personal opinions and reflections (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The authors of this 
study are aware that this study could be affected by their interest and therefore they have 
considered this during the whole thesis in order to minimize the risks of personal influence.   
4.2 Formulating the theoretical framework 
Literature review 
It is recommended to use some form of a literature review on what is currently available in 
the subject area and then focuses on creating new knowledge in the research (Bryman & Bell, 
2015; Svensson & Starrin, 1996). A literature review has been designed in this study in order 
to be able to understand the research field. The literature review has enabled to identify a 
research gap and also develop a theoretical framework. In order to conduct relevant literature 
for the study, the following databases have been used: Google Scholar, Web of Science and 
Primo. The search words have been young farmer, tenancy, agriculture, establish, entering, 
farming, farm leasing, and contract agreement. The study focuses mainly on primary sources 
ahead of secondary sources. Primary sources use the original source, and the secondary 
sources refer to the original source (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Therefore, is it important to not 
only use secondary sources since the author can use subjective valuations.  
Choice of theories 
In this thesis, the principal-agent theory and stakeholder theories form the base for the 
theoretical framework. The principal-agent theory was chosen in order to provide a greater 
understanding of the relation between the landowner and the tenant. The principal-agent 
theory is well developed within the insurance market (Groweningen et al., 2010). Though, in 
order to fully understand the core of the principal-agent theory, it is necessary to perform a 
more in-depth analysis of the theory. The frame of the principal-agent theory begins with the 
most fundamental aspects of the theory that later develops to more detailed and deeper 
aspects. In figure 3, is the principal-agent model presented and includes the most important 
elements of the theory in order to fully understand the concept. These elements are adverse 
selection, moral hazard, information asymmetry, transaction costs, portfolio problem, horizon 
problem, and hold- up problem (Groenewegen et al., 2010; Saam, 2007; Cook, 1995; Borgen, 
2004). All these elements are relevant to use in this study since they explain how an 
agreement between a landowner and a tenant may affect each other, both before and after a 
contract agreement.  
It is important to understand and satisfy the stakeholders since they have a significant impact 
on the success of the business (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Wagner Mainardes et al., 2011). 
Therefore the stakeholder theory has been chosen for this study since the external actors have 
a major impact on the tenant’s opportunity to enter farming and to develop their farm 
business. Usually, stakeholder theory can be applied in any business.  
Although, the theoretical model has not been developed for an agrarian context, and therefore 
has the stakeholder theory been modified in order to be suitable for the tenant’s stakeholder. 
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The chosen stakeholders are presented in figure 4 which are; institutional organization, 
government, customers, consulting, employees, financial organization, and landowners. 
While, Local Community Organizations, Consumer Advocates, Competitors, Media, SIG, and 
Environmentalists are excluded from this study since these stakeholders do not have a major 
impact on the tenant’s farm business. Instead, the stakeholder theory in this study has been 
extended with institutional organizations, consulting, financial organizations, and landowners. 
The reason for these chosen stakeholders is because they are considered to be the most 
important for the tenant’s opportunity to enter farming through tenancy.  
4.3 Empirical data 
 
 Choice of respondents 
 
A multiple case study is commonly used in a qualitative research approach when the focus is 
to improve the contextual understanding of the cases (Bryman & Bell, 2015). This study 
entails twelve respondents, where eight of them are young farmers. The other four 
respondents are external actors within the agricultural sector that might have an impact on the 
young farmers’ possibility to develop their business. The chosen number of respondents is 
sufficient in order to accomplish a nuanced empirical result in a qualitative approach (Gentles 
et al., 2015; Johnsson & Weidman, 2016; Yin, 2009). This study does not have the purpose of  
generalizing the results, instead, the focus is to obtain a deeper understanding of the context 
(Yin, 2009). It is important to not have too few cases in order to attain relevant findings and 
thereby achieve the aim of the study (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Trost, 2010). Although, including 
additional cases might not necessarily contribute with more findings than those twelve 
respondents have made in the study. The twelve respondents are considered to be sufficient 
since this number of cases have been used in previous research, for example in Johnsson & 
Weidman (2016) thesis.  
 
By using a multiple case study, the researcher facilitate a comparison of the empirical 
findings of each case, and thereby clarifies what is unique and what are common patterns 
between the cases (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The multiple case study therefore usually creates a 
deeper analytical understanding and improves theory building (Robson, 2011; Bryman & 
Bell, 2015). The comparison between the cases creates an opportunity for the researcher to 
establish the circumstances whether or not the theory will be held in the study (Bryman & 
Bell, 2015). A multiple case study can also serve as a compliment since the cases might cover 
different areas within the topic of the research (Robson, 2011).  
 
Purposive sampling is used in this thesis since the purpose is not to sample the respondents on 
a random basis (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The motive to choose purposive sampling is because 
the researchers have the ambition to collect the respondents in a strategic way in order to 
ensure that those samples are relevant for the thesis. Purposive sampling is a non-probability 
sample form and therefore does not allow the authors to generalize to a specific population. 
The selection of respondents focuses on finding young farmers under 40 years old and who 
have established their business through farm tenancy. The reason young farmers have been 
selected is based on their difficulties to enter farming through tenancy with the current 
circumstances. Furthermore, the selection of young farmers has been based on that they 
should have at least ten hectares of tenancy agreement, and the dominant part of the total 
arable land should be cultivated through tenancy agreements.  
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The respondents for the young farmers have been collected through two different 
organizations in Sweden: The tenancy foundation in Scania (Skånes arrendatorförbund) and 
The Federation of Swedish Farmers Youth Scania (LRF Ungdomen Skåne).  
The reason to include external actors in this thesis is because young farmers might be highly 
affected by the external actors within the agricultural sector. The external actors have been 
selected mainly based on those who have a significant impact on young farmers opportunity 
to enter farming through tenancy. The chosen external actors in this thesis are: private 
landowner, institutional landowner, consulting firm for tenancy agreement, and a bank since 
these are considered to have a significant impact on the young tenants’ opportunity in the 
sector.  
The young farmers and external actors have been chosen from the southern region in Sweden, 
more specifically Scania. The argument to select the region Scania in this study is mainly 
based on two crucial factors. The first factor is related to statistics from Enhäll (2017) which 
indicates that Scania is a region with one of the highest number of tenancy agreements in 
Sweden. The second factor is because Scania has one of the highest rental rates for farmland 
in Sweden (Lantbruksregister, 2016). These arguments are illustrated in figure 6 where the 
average rental rates and the distribution of young tenants are presented. For this reason, the 
researcher in this study considers that the basis of these two factors might contribute to 
interesting and valuable insights into young farmers‘ opportunities to enter farming through 
tenancy.  
Data collection 
The empirical data collection is based on semi-structured interviews. The researchers have 
interviewed the respondents face-to-face in order to obtain a broader contextual understanding 
of the participants’ social reality (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Although, one interview was done 
by telephone since there was no possibility to conduct a personal interview with the 
respondent. Telephone-interviews are considered to have a lack of contextual understanding, 
Figure 6:  Average rental rate of agricultural land in Sweden and distribution of young tenants in 
Sweden (Enhäll, 2017; Lantbruksregister, 2016: own modification). 
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and it is easier that misunderstandings arise. Despite the disadvantages of a telephone 
interview, the researchers believe that the telephone-interview contributed with important 
empirical findings and therefore was motivated to include in the study. The semi-structured 
design enables as to obtain a higher and more reliable conformity between the theory and 
empirical findings. However, semi-structured interviews also allow the questions to be 
changed in different orders and reformulated depending on the outcome of the interview. 
Supplementary questions are also provided to use in order to follow-up on the respondent 
answers. The interview schedule is more of a general form and flexible since it allows the 
respondent to give a personal reflection (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Robson 2011).  
The questions for the interviews are designed through themes and are placed in order to guide 
the respondents (Robson, 2011). The questions are presented in appendix 1 for young farmers 
and appendix 2 for external actors. The themes for the young farmers are based on their 
situation before the tenancy contract, the current situation, and future conditions. The reason 
that the themes are chosen is due to the principal-agent theory where adverse selection (before 
contract) and moral hazard (after contract) are central aspects. Semi-structured interviews are 
most suitable for research where the interviewers are closely involved in the process. 
Therefore, it is essential for the researchers to be aware that they are the most important tool 
for the process and development of this study (Robson, 2011). The researchers have therefore 
tried to be aware of this through the entire study. 
One week before collecting the empirical data a pilot interview was conducted face-to-face 
with a young farmer in Mälardalen. The reason to have a pilot interview was to ensure that the 
interview schedule contains qualified questions and the researchers thereby obtain interesting 
empirical findings (Robson, 2011). Another reason to use pilot interview was to ensure that 
the questions were clear and easily formulated. After the pilot-interview, some small 
adjustments were made. The face-to-face interviews were collected between March 19th and 
April 4th, 2018 and the telephone interview was conducted April 11th, 2018. It is important to 
provide a comfortable environment for the respondents (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Therefore, 
the interviews with the young farmers have been conducted at each farm and the external 
actors took place at their office. Each interview took approximately between 30 to 120 
minutes. Both researchers participated during all the interviews in order to ensure that all the 
questions were asked correctly and to achieve a better contextual understanding. The young 
farmers and the external actors had different questionnaires (see appendix 1 and 2) although, 
some questions are the same for all the respondents. It was necessary to have different 
questions for the young farmers and the external actors in order to obtain great empirical 
findings and thereby be able to achieve the aim of the study and answer the research 
questions.  
Data presentation 
The presentation of the collected data begins with an overview of the linkage between the 
collected empirical data and the chosen theories in this research. The data presentation 
continuous with a description of each young farmer and external actor in order to improve the 
understanding of each case. The empirical data from the young farmers are categorized after 
which theory it could be stemmed from and in the combination of different time periods. 
These periods are related to before entering a tenancy agreement, current situation with a 
tenancy agreement and future aspects of a tenancy agreement. The empirical data from the 
external actors are also categorized after which theory it could be derived from. By using 
categorization, it enables a more manageable data and also creates an overview of the 
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characteristics key concepts (Bryman & Bell, 2015). This is an important part of the coding 
process, in order to minimize the risk of losing the social context after processing and 
transcribing the empirical data. The empirical data was summarized and then translated into 
English. The researchers are aware of the possibilities that the transcriptions and the 
translation to English may have provided some incorrect interpretations of the data. Both 
researchers have examined the transcription and translation in order to minimize the risk of 
incorrect interpretation. The empirical findings are complemented by using tables in the 
chapter of the empirical data in order to achieve a better overview.  
Data analysis 
To be able to analyze the empirical data it is important to be creative and have a structure in 
order to find patterns and unique aspects (Trost, 2010). In order to facilitate the process of the 
empirical data, three steps have been used in this study. These steps are processing, analysis, 
and interpretation. The first step entails to summarize and structure the interview material. 
The second step is to analyze the data on the basis of existing knowledge in the area. Here it is 
important that the authors have the creativity required to find patterns and to create an 
understanding. The last step is about interpretation, where the theory is connected to the 
empirical findings. In qualitative research, there are limited guidelines on how to analyze and 
interpret the research, which can make the research process difficult.  
4.4 Quality assurance 
It is necessary to clarify terms and ways of forming and evaluate the quality of research 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). There are various opportunities to achieve quality in a research. 
Trustworthiness and authenticity are usually used in qualitative research.  
Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness is based on four criteria in order to achieve quality assurance: credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Bryman & Bell, 2015).  
Credibility is about controlling that the researcher’ apprehension is correctly understood in the 
social reality (Bryman & Bell, 2015). In order to achieve credibility, the researcher has to 
make sure that the study has been designed according to the stated rules. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to submit the empirical findings and send it to the respondents in order to confirm 
that the results have been perceived correctly. In this research, the credibility has been 
ensured by using respondent validation. The interviews were recorded and then transcribed 
before the researchers sent the empirical material to the young farmers and the external actors 
by e-mail. The respondents had the opportunity to discover and clarify potential 
misunderstandings from the interview and therefore ensure the researchers had achieved a 
correct understanding of the reality.  
Transferability can be accomplished by applying the results of the study to another context 
that is beyond the social situation, and that has been observed (Bryman & Bell, 2015). This is 
essential but can be rather difficult in qualitative research since the focus is to obtain more in-
depth understanding and emphasize unique aspects. The researchers in this study have used a 
thick and detailed description of the respondents’ opinions, which enables the reader to 
determine whether the result can be used in another social context.   
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Dependability can be obtained by creating a complete description of all stages in the research 
process and using a reviewed auditing (Bryman & Bell, 2015). This is conducted in this study 
since all the phases of the process in the method chapter are explained. Additionally, both 
researchers have reviewed the empirical data to ensure that the interpretation and analysis 
have been made appropriately and thereby ensure that the conclusions are correct. 
Complete objectivity is not possible to achieve in qualitative research (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
It is therefore important to use confirmability in this research. The reason is to ensure that 
personal values have not affected the results and the analysis of the study, which may 
otherwise occur in qualitative research. The confirmability in this study has been confirmed 
by examining the result of the thesis in order to obtain reasonable results without affection 
from the researchers’ values.  
Authenticity 
Authenticity includes fairness, which intends to convey the respondents’ opinion and 
conditions correctly (Bryman & Bell, 2015). In order to obtain fairness in this study 
respondent validation have been made. This enabled the respondents to ensure that the 
researchers have made correct interpretations of the interviews and to change possible 
misunderstandings. Additionally, a description of each farmer and external actor has been sent 
to the respondents in order to ensure a correct understanding of their business. Furthermore, 
authenticity assumes that the respondents convey a correct and fair image of their opinions 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). This is difficult for the researchers to ensure in this study since the 
respondents may have reconstructed their course of action concerning the young farmers´ 
opportunity to enter farming through tenancy. Although, during the interviews the experience 
was that the farmers and external actors contributed with honest and realistic answers to the 
questions even if it is difficult to know surely.    
4.5 Ethical considerations 
In a qualitative study, it is essential to include ethical considerations (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
Since this study has collected the empirical data from respondents’, it is even more important 
to address ethical considerations. Some aspects are especially important to consider in a study 
that contains participants’ own values and experiences. These are volunteering, integrity, 
confidentiality, and anonymity (Bryman & Bell, 2015). In order to achieve these ethical 
considerations, the researchers’ have informed the respondents about the aim of the study, 
their voluntary participation and their right to interrupt the interview at any time or the 
opportunity to not answer a question they might not be comfortable with. There has been an 
ambition to achieve these ethical considerations through the thesis as far as possible. The 
respondents’ identities should be anonymized if it is a request from them otherwise they 
should be well informed about what it entails not to be anonymous (Bryman & Bell, 2015). It 
is also necessary to clarify for the respondents how the collected data will be used. In this 
study, all the respondents are anonymous since it is a request from them. Therefore, the 
researchers have taken this into consideration. Since the respondents are anonymous in this 
study, a brief description is provided in order to minimize the risk of recognition. 
Furthermore, the respondents have been allocated a randomly chosen coding number.  
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5 The empirical data 
The following chapter begins with a description of the respondents, farmers and external 
actors. The chapter includes information from the interview of the young farmers, which is 
presented for different periods, before the tenancy, the current situation and lastly the future. 
At the end of the chapter is the empirical data from the external actors presented. 
In table 2 are the structural overview of the empirical data presented. The empirics are 
connected with the principal-agent theory and the stakeholder theory for the different time 
periods in the section of the young farmers. The different time periods for the young farmers 
are mainly based on adverse selection (before contract) and moral hazard (after contract) in 
the principal-agent theory. The different time periods are also framed in the interview 
questions (Appendix 1 and 2) and the time periods are illustrated in figure 7. In addition, 
external actors are combined and structured with the same theories as for the young farmers. 
The connections are described in table 2, which are based on the theoretical framework, the 
literature review, and the empirical data. 
Figure 7: Time periods in the tenancy contract situation 
An explanation of the empirical data 
Table 2: A structural overview and description of the empirical chapter (own modification). 
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5.1 Description of respondents 
The interviewed farmers have different backgrounds and experience that had lead to where 
they are today in their farm business. In order to get a better overview and understanding of 
the collected data, the farmers are described shortly in the section 5.1.1. The description 
includes, for example, parameters such as the farmer’s age, their geographical location, the 
area of farmed agricultural land, the focus of their business, when they entered their first 
tenancy and about their last tenancy extension. In this section, there is also a description of the 
length of the contracts and possibilities for extension, which are illustrated in table 3. 
Furthermore, in section 5.1.2 the external actors are described in order to obtain a better 
understanding of the external environment.  
 Young farmers 
Farmer A:  
The farmer is 29 years old and farms 100 hectares of land in northeastern Scania, where 75 
hectares is rented land. The primary focus of the business is livestock production, and the 
leased area is mainly used for pastures and growing corn. The business is conducted on a full-
time basis in a private company. The farmer became a tenant in March 2015 and began to rent 
25 hectares of farmland, and the most recent tenancy agreement was in March 2018 with 5 
hectares of land.  
Farmer B:  
The farmer is 30 years old and is a tenant with 290 hectares of farmland, which is rented 
together with two siblings in the western part of Scania. The business is carried out as a full-
time private company where crop production is combined with a contracting business. The 
first tenancy agreement was achieved in 2014, and the latest expansion took place this year.  
Farmer C:  
Three siblings between 29 and 38 years farm 630 hectares of tillable farmland in the western 
part of Scania. Of their total area are, 460 hectares is rented land and are located within a 30 
km radius. Their business focuses on plant cultivation, but they are also active in the 
contracting business. The business is conducted full-time in a limited company (AB). They 
started as tenants with 110 hectares of arable land, and the latest expansion of 7 hectares 
occurred in 2017. 
Farmer D:  
The farmer is 29 years old and rents 80 hectares of tillable land in central Scania. The 
business is on full-time and is a private company with the primary focus on plant cultivation. 
The farmer combines crop cultivation with a non-agricultural contract construction business. 
The firm obtained the first contract of 80 hectares in March 2018 and have now further the 
ambitions to rent additional farmland in the future.  
Farmer E:  
The farmer is 33 years old and operates a total of 250 hectares of leased land in northwestern 
Scania. The firm has mainly crop production but the business is combined with a farm shop 
and rents out trailers for example. The farm business is a limited company (AB), and all three 
firms provide full-time employment. The business was established through a tenancy 
agreement 2008 by renting 30 hectares of land. The latest tenancy agreement was acquired in 
2010 with 250 hectares of land, and since then no expansion has occurred.  
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Farmer F:  
The farmer is 33 years old and operates a total of 210 hectares of leased land in northwestern 
Scania. The primary focus is grain production though they also run a machinery service. The 
business is operated as a private company on full-time basis. The farmer started as a tenant 
2010 with 227 hectares, and the latest contract was received in 2012 with 95 hectares of 
tillable land.  
Farmer G:  
The farmer is 33 years old and farms 1030 hectares of arable land in southern Scania, where 
22 of these hectares are owned property. He mainly focuses on crop production and the 
business is full-time and operates as a limited company. The first contract was received in 
2012 with 350 hectares of tillable land. The most recent tenancy agreement was obtained this 
year with 50 hectares of farmland. 
Farmer H:  
The farm is operated by a couple that is 29 and 28 years old. They farm 270 hectares in 
western Scania. The primary production is an organic vegetable and grain cultivation. The 
business is full-time and is operated as a limited company. They established their business 
with the first tenancy contract in 2013 with 85 hectares. The most recent agreement was 
received this year with 135 hectares of tillable land.  
Table 3:  Description of the length of the contracts and possibilities for extension 
 External actors 
External actor A:  Private landowner 
The agricultural administrators are working with forest, hunting, and management of the 
farmland. The administrators have significant practical experiences from different areas in the 
agricultural and hunting sector. The private landowner has 13 000 hectares of forest and 
agricultural land mainly in Eastern Scania. They administrate 3000 hectares of agricultural 
tenancy land whereof there are five farm tenancies and 80 side tenancies.   
External actor B: Institutional landowner 
The agricultural administrators work with the tenancy relationships within the institutional 
organization. Geographically they operate in the regions of Scania and Blekinge. The 
administrators have previous work experience within the agricultural sector. One of the 
administrators is educated at SLU in agriculture and rural management, and one is an 
agronomist in business administration. The institutional landowner, manage 22 000 hectares 
forest and agricultural land where everything is administrated as 54 farm tenancies and 170 
side tenancies.   
Length of the contracts Interest of extension 
Farm A 1 - 3 years contracts Positive to extension 
Farm B 3 - 5 years contracts Yes 
Farm C 1 - 5 years contracts Yes 
Farm D 1-year contracts Automatically extension 
Farm E Mostly 5 years contracts Yes 
Farm F 11 months - 5 years contracts Uncertain about the future 
Farm G 1 - 5 years contracts Yes 
Farm H 1 & 5 years contracts Yes 
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External actor C: Consulting firm 
The tenancy specialist in the region of Scania works with consulting for tenancy agreements, 
tenancy inspection, and education. The consultant graduated at SLU as an agronomist in 
business administration and has long work experience in the agricultural sector.   
External actor D: Bank 
The agricultural specialist works at a bank in southern Sweden. The specialist has worked in 
the bank sector for 18 years and is today administrating the businesses from a central 
perspective. The specialist has previous experiences in both private and industrial agriculture. 
The agricultural specialist at the bank is educated at SLU in Agriculture and rural 
management.  
5.2 The farmers perspective 
Before entering farmland through tenancy 
The relationship between landowner and tenant 
Reason to enter a tenancy agreement 
According to farmer A, the reason for establishing farmland through tenancy is that it enables 
a way to start a farm business without major investments. This also makes it possible to exit 
the business at any time due to the low investments. It usually takes a long time before you 
earn some money and instead it takes a lot of capital. It is important to earn money because 
with tenancy agreements, compared to owning property, there is no asset appreciation.   
A majority of the farmers emphasize that the most fundamental reason for entering farming 
through tenancy is that they did not have any other option. Even if you have a good and stable 
economy there is usually no possibility to purchase farmland because it is expensive. 
Although, one possible way to purchase farmland is to transfer property, or if the parents can 
offer collateral, but not everyone has that opportunity. All of the farmers agree they would 
rather purchase farmland instead of renting in order to secure their future and minimize the 
risk of losing the land. Purchasing farmland also enables frequent investments and taking part 
in the appreciation of asset values for the property. Another advantage of owning farmland is 
that it enhances the possibility to obtain loans from the bank. Some of the farmers also argue 
that there is a high level of competition for the farmland in their area and therefore is difficult 
to purchase farmland.   
The reason they achieved their tenancy agreement   
One farmer points out that the reason that they obtained the tenancy contract is probably due 
to the fact that the landowners are positive towards young farmers since they are quite a few 
in the area. However, some farmers say they had the opportunity to take over the contract 
from their family because they have rented the farmland for generations. Furthermore, one 
farmer emphasizes that they could also rent some farmland from their parents since they the 
own land. Some of the farmers also point out that a good reputation in the neighborhood or 
from previous work colleagues has contributed to security to their tenancy contracts. A good 
relationship and knowledge of the landowner is probably the most important factor in order to 
be able to receive tenancy contract. None of the farmers have received their tenancy contract 
on the open market by providing the highest bid. 
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Preparation before the contract  
Farmer A and C have by routine used previous contracts but has then reformulated some parts 
of the previous agreement so it would suit them better. Farmer C consulted experts from 
consulting firms when signing and writing larger tenancy contract. One farmer usually just 
renewe an earlier contract that has been in the family business for a longer time. Two of the 
farmers use oral contracts. According to one farmer, the landowner organized the majority of 
the tenancy arrangements during the first tenancy period. The tenant did not have so much 
experience from tenancy. This farmer regrets this today because he has learned from previous 
mistakes.  
 
Relationship to the landowner  
Majority of the farmers had a good relationship and knowledge with their landowners before 
they received their tenancy contracts. One farmer was even offered the tenancy contract 
without having to bid for it. Though farmer C had a different relationship with their 
landowner. Some farmers are closer than others to their landowners, but in general they have 
some previous connection to the landowners before they sign a tenancy contract. Farmer A 
did not have any relationship at all to the landowners before they received their tenancy 
contracts. 
 
Expectations with the tenancy agreement  
More or less all of the farmers expect to make profits attributable to their tenancies. Some 
farmer points out that they will be able to continue with their farm so all of the involved 
people can make a living with a reasonable income. Farmer G points out that it is hard to 
predict expectations in advanced because of uncertain in the future and that it is hard to 
predict the landowner’s plans. One farmer mainly states they expected to get a good harvest. 
However, farmer B and F emphasize that they expected that to develop on a personal level 
and with their business. They also want their business to grow and operate efficiently. Farmer 
D mainly states that their expectations are based on willingness and the possibilities. The 
farmer also highlights that a tenancy agreement requires a high level of responsibility. 
Furthermore, the farmers stress that tenancy agreements are another way of thinking since it is 
much to learn from the arrangements.  
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Table 4:  Before entering farmland through tenancy - Relationship landowner and tenant 
Reason to enter 
tenancy
The reason they 
achieved their tenancy
Preparation 
before the contract
Relationship to 
the landowner
Expectations with 
the tenancy
Varied
 relationship 
Continue to develop 
the business
Farmer D
Impossible to 
purchase farmland 
Received tenacy 
through contacts 
Constructed by a 
consulting firm
Good 
relationship 
Develop personal level 
and achieve profit
No previous
 relationship 
Achieve a good
 crop yield
Farmer B
Too high prices to 
purchase farmland
Received the 
opportunity to inherit 
contracts
No specific preparation, 
inherited tenancies
Good 
relationships
Achieve profit and 
develop a successful 
business
Farmer A
Good way to 
enter farming  
Landowners are positive 
towards young farmers
Reformulated previous 
arrangements
Farmer C
Limitied supply,
 high prices 
for farmland 
Good reputation from 
the neighborhood
Help from consulting 
firms for larger contracts 
Good
 relationship
Difficult to predict 
in advanced  
Farmer H
 Inherited farmland Good relationship 
with the neighbors
Sometimes arranged by 
consulting 
Mostly good 
relationship 
Be able to take out 
a reasonable income
Good 
relationship 
Achieve profit 
Farmer F
Impossible to 
purchase farmland 
Good relationships to 
the landowners 
The landowners have 
organized the 
arrangements 
Good 
relationship 
Grow and develop 
the farm business 
Farmer E
 Inherited farmland Contracts within
 the family
 Both oral and written 
arrangements
Farmer G
No other option than 
leasing farmland
Good relationship to 
landowners & neighbors
No specific preparation
 
 
External environment  
Consulting for the contract  
The interviewed farmers have prepared the agreements differently before they signed the 
contracts for the tenancies. Some of the tenancy arrangements are verbal, but the majority of 
the contracts are written. A few farmers have used consulting services to formulate the 
agreements, and a few have discussed the formalities with friends and family. Services such 
as with consulting and extra support in the contract writing process are typically used when 
signing contracts for larger farms.  
 
Laws and regulations affections 
The reflection is that laws and regulations have no negative effects on the majority of the 
tenants. Farmer F stresses that the tenancy law is an advantage for the tenant that can be 
perceived as the weaker party in the tenancy relationship. Farmer D mentions that the direct 
income payment affects the rental rate and argues that the economic result for many farm 
businesses is built on the area-based support and that the financial situation, is usually not as 
stable without it.  
 
Trust to external actors   
Almost all of the farm respondents feel in some way that they have a good relationship with 
their external actors. Farm E points out if there are actors that you are comfortable with you 
stick to them. Farmer A argues that it is an opportunity to change collaborating with actors to 
improve better trust and faith in each relationship.   
 
Banks opportunity to give credit   
Farmer C and G point out that owning farmland increases the security when you are in need 
of a loan for operating a tenancy. Otherwise, the respondents mention that the bank prefers to 
examine economic calculations, results, and cash flow statements from the farm’s businesses 
to be able to give credits. A guarantee provided by the family is also common in order to 
achieve a tenancy agreement emphasizes farmer B. 
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Table 5: Before entering farmland through tenancy – the external environment 
Before:	External	actors
Consulting for 
the contract
 Laws and
 regulations 
affections
Trust to 
external actors
Banks opportunity 
to give credit
Farmer H
Not used consulting, 
achieve good advice 
from a friend  
Affected related 
to the 
tenancy law
Good reputation and 
therefore good trust
Require security 
and cash flow
Farmer A
Did not use 
consulting 
Not affected by 
the legislation 
The trust
have been improved
Difficult, want more 
security
Farmer B
No consulting, used 
previous contracts
Not affected by 
the legislation 
Good trust Require security and 
balanced economy
Farmer C
Used only 
consulting for 
major agreements
No reflections Good trust from 
the bank and 
the consulting firm
Require owned
 farmland and thereby 
increase the security 
Farmer D
Used consulting for 
the contracts    
The support have 
affected the 
rental rate 
Good trust 
because of 
good network 
Require return 
on capital
Farmer E
Not used consulting, 
discussed instead 
with family
Nothing that has  
been an obstacle
Good trust, keep the 
contacts who have 
good reliance to them
Want to see 
improved results
Farmer F
Did not use 
consulting before  
Tenancy law is 
an advantage for 
the tenant  
Varied trust Not easy, the bank 
have to support the 
young farmers
Farmer G
Good reputation and 
therefore good trust
Necessary 
with security
Not affected by 
the legislation 
Did not use 
consulting before, 
discussed with 
friends instead 
 
 Current situation with tenancy 
 
The relationship between landowner and tenant 
Rental rate 
The rental rates vary between all the farmers within this study, which is revealed in table 6. 
However, the level of rental rates may depend on the location, level of support and yield 
conditions. The different rental rates can also be related to different risk preferences in the 
tenancy relationship. Some farmers believe that a high rental rate should entail more 
involvement by the landowners and that a lower price may not result in so much participation.  
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Table 6: An overview of the rental rates from the empirical data (own modification) 
 
Integrated expectations  
Three of the farmers agree that they have reached their expectations with the tenancy 
agreement, though some farmer points out that it has been harder than predicted. Although, 
farmer F emphasizes instead that it has become very different than expected because it has 
been challenging and difficult but sometimes it has been easier and enjoyable. Farmer A did 
not have any expectations at all upon the tenancy contract because they did not know what 
would happens and how it would develop. 
 
Farmer C points out that the expectations have not been met since they thought the economic 
result would be better than realized results. The profitability within the agricultural sector has 
decreased during the past six years due to low grain prices, reduced area-based support 
payment, and high rental rates. When a rental rate is on a specified level, it is difficult to 
change it even if the fundamental conditions have changed. Farmer D hoped for a better start 
related to the weather and farmer B would like to develop crop production even more. 
 
Perceived positive profitability  
Farm A and B claim that their profitability is positive which is mainly due to a reasonable 
rental rate and their construction businesses. On the contrary, some farmers point out that it is 
challanging to become profitable. One of the farmers points out that the competition for the 
farmland is very high, which adversely affects profitability. The profitability is reasonable, 
and their business is going well according to farmer G and H. Furthermore, farmer H states 
that they are innovative by growing profitable crops and the rental rate cannot increase further 
because it is already too high. Farmer G states that it is their other businesses that ensure a 
positive profitability. Farmer D has a goal to reach at least more than a 3 % profit margin, 
though most preferably it would be a 5 % profit margin. Although, it will take some time 
before the business can reach these margins. 
 
Effects of farmland prices and rental rates  
Almost all of the farmers insist that land- and rental rates have affected their business 
profitability. According to two of the farmers, the reason is that many wants to extend their 
business with tenancy and the demand for agricultural land has increased. Due to the high 
level of capital intensity within the agricultural sector and the difficulties to earn more money 
through external activities, it is difficult to reach profitability goals.  
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The price development of grains and the increasing rental rates do not follow each other. 
When the grain prices increase the rental rates rise, but when the grain prices decrease the 
rental rates remain at their previous level. One farmer emphasizes that the rental rates are 
affected by both landowners and those who are interested in renting farmland. Although, 
arable land rental rates have decreased markedly over the past years and the expectation is 
that this trend continues. Some farmers state that if the prices were lower, the profitability 
would have been even higher. Although, this farmer argues that they have reasonable rental 
rate and contract agreements. Two farmers point out that they have always been very careful 
not to accept too high rental rates. Although, one of them never had to say no to an 
arrangement because of too high rental rate. 
 
Current relationship to the landowner  
The majority of the farmers have a good relationship and communication with their 
landowners. Though several of the farmers emphasize that the relation to some of the 
landowners is not so good because they are in a middle of a conflict or have had one. Usually, 
the conflicts concern the rental rates or more of a formal principle where it is difficult to get a 
new part of the contract without being able to create a new contract. Farmer E argues that it is 
important to discuss difficult situations that may occur for the first time or when signing the  
contract agreement. Then it becomes easier to deal with problems in the future. Everything is 
about give and take between the tenant and the landowner.    
 
Length and extension of the contract   
The length of the contracts varies for each farmer, they can be from 11 months to five years. 
The majority of the farmers are interested in extending their contracts, even if one farm points 
out that the rental rate is too high and would, therefore, like to renegotiate that contract. 
Furthermore, one farmer feels insecure about the future and therefore is not sure whether to 
extend the contract or not. Some of the farmers consider that a contract beyond one year is 
safer than a contract shorter than one year. The reason is because the law (protected tenancy), 
which come into effect when a contract is one year or longer. A longer tenancy agreement 
provides incentives to invest in additional farmland. However, some of the farmers emphasize 
that even a one year contract might be considered to be safe since they have operated these 
tenancies for several years without any uncertainty about the extension.  
 
Possibility to say no to a tenancy agreement 
Most of the farmers within the study point out that they could say no to a contract if they were 
offered one. The most fundamental reason is related to that they do not want to pay too high 
rental rates. Other reasons for refusing a contract are the conditions, location or the types of 
landowners. In order to say yes to a tenancy contract, it should be both profitable and 
interesting. One farmer claims that the profitability does not increase because of more 
farmland. It is not this factor that determines whether the business is successful or not.  
Farmer A, on the other hand, states that many times there is no possibility to say no to an 
offer because of difficulties to be satisfied. 
 
Actions if the expectations are not received  
Some of the farmers say that if the tenancy arrangement does not meet their expectations, they 
will try to renegotiate with the landowner to either get a lower rental rate or another suitable 
solution. However, you do not want to pay too much if there are significant deficiencies. One 
farmer points out that when a tenancy contract does not fulfill the expectations, it is important 
to clarify why and take action.  
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Farmer D says that it is important not to give up. The first years are usually difficult and 
intensive. Several farmers emphasize that they would not terminate the arrangement in the 
first place. However, farm H has no problem in terminating a tenancy if it does not fulfill the 
expectations. 
 
Table 7: The Current situation with tenancies- Relationship landowner and tenant 
Current:	Landowner	and	tenant
Integrated 
expectations
Perceived 
positive
profitability
Effects of 
farmlands 
prices and 
rental rate
Current 
relationship to 
the landowner
Possibility 
to say 
no to a tenancy
Actions if 
expectations 
not received
Negotiate or 
discuss with the 
landowner
Farmer H
Yes Okay Affected Some better 
some less good
Yes Could terminate 
arrangement
Farmer G
Yes Okay Affected Varies Yes
Negotiate 
Farmer F
Almost fulfilled the 
expectations
Unprofitable Affected Mostly good, 
some are 
less good
Yes, it has 
to be of 
interest and 
profitable 
Negotiate  
Farmer E
Yes Difficult Not affected Better 
over time
Yes
Negotiate 
Farmer D
Hoped for a better 
start 
The goal is to 
receive 5 % 
profit margins
Affected Good 
relation
Depends on the 
price
Not give up in 
the first place
Farmer C
Not really fulfilled 
the expectations
Should have 
been better
Affected Good 
relation 
Yes
Investigate why 
not received  
expectation 
Farmer B
Almost fulfilled 
expectations
Requires hard 
work to be 
profitable
Affected Good 
relation
Yes Discuss with the 
landowner
Farmer A
None previous 
expectations
Positive Affected Good 
relation
Difficult to 
say no 
 
 
External environment  
Most important external actor 
Two farmers state that the most important external actor for them is the bank because without 
them they would not be able to manage their business. Furthermore, some farmers believe that 
there are several important external actors, such as consulting firms relating for crop 
production and support from their family. A consulting firm enables a discussion and provides 
valuable advice to improve the economic result. The family can be a support for the tenant, 
especially if they are or previously been involved in the business and have great knowledge of 
the farmland. Farmer D emphasize that the most important external actors are the landowners. 
Furthermore, farmer E and G stress that the most important part is the employees. Therefore, 
it is necessary to take good care of the employees and appreciate them to create a stable 
relation to them.  
 
Effects of laws and regulations today  
Some farmers reveal that they do not experience any impact of the laws and regulations 
within the agricultural sector. Although, farmer D emphasize that the laws and regulations 
always are a limiting factor and therefore it is important to make the most of it. Additionally, 
farmer E states that laws and regulations will not become any better in the future since there 
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will very likely be significant changes in the agricultural policy. Furthermore, some farmers 
claim that the laws and regulations are time-consuming and costly since some farmers receive 
support from a consulting firm in order to make sure that everything is correctly managed.  
 
Farmer H reveals that the laws and regulations affect them negatively because they received 
the support payment for newly established businesses too late. This support would have been 
valuable from the beginning of the business and thereby avoiding loans from the parents since 
the bank does not want to take any risks with a new business. Additionally, farmer H 
emphasizes that the landowners may sometimes have their own rules which affect them 
negatively.  
 
Trust and faith in young farmers  
Most of the farmers think it is positive to be a young farmer in the agricultural sector since 
some of the external actors believe in them and want to give support. Farmer F mentions that 
some external actors say that they would like to provide support to the young and newly 
established farmers. However, in reality, they become insecure and consider it being too much 
of a risk. Farmer D and E argues that the reliance towards young farmers depends on different 
external actors, though it is usually their personality that contributes to a broader level of 
trust.   
 
The right time to enter farming through tenancy 
Almost all of the farmers state that it was the right time to establish their farm business 
through tenancy agreement, mostly because they had the opportunity to do it. Farmer A 
claims that tenancy agreements enable them to purchase farmland in the future since it is 
important to present your skills to the bank. If you can show that you can meet profitability 
requirements with a tenancy operation, it indicates what you can accomplish. A tenancy 
contract enables you to develop a successful business. Although, farmer C considers that it 
was not the right time to enter their tenancy arrangements. The reason that when when they 
came into the tenancy contracts, they faced a high level of competition, a high level of 
agricultural support payments, and high grain prices which have contributed to high rental 
rates. They thought that the profitability within the agricultural sector would last for a more 
extended time of period. After a tenancy agreement has been signed, it is difficult to 
renegotiate the terms even if the fundamental conditions have changed.  
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Table 8: Current situation – The external environment 
Important 
external actor
Effections of laws and 
regulation today
Right time to enter 
through tenancy
Farmer B
Bank, family and 
consulting firms for 
crop production
Not really Yes
Farmer A Bank Not really Yes
Farmer D Landowner Always a limited factor Yes
Farmer C
Consulting firms Time consuming Not really
Farmer F The farm advice Difficult, time consuming Yes
Farmer E
Employees Affects, will be big changes Yes
Farmer H
The parents No affection
Some landowners have their 
own rules
Yes
Farmer G Employees No affection Yes
 
 
 Future plans with tenancy 
 
The relationship between landowner and tenant 
The future view of tenancy arrangements  
Some of the farmers would like to combine their tenancy contract with purchased farmland to 
develop a more balanced farm business. Farmer H claims that owned property enables the 
farmer to enhance security for the future. Two farmers are satisfied and want to develop their 
current situation. Farmer E intends to focus on more land and enlarge the farm business in the 
near future. Farmer F tells that the future is doubtful in terms of the tenancy arrangements and 
is therefore not sure if the business will last until next year. 
 
The willingness to extend the business with more tenancy agreements 
Farmer D underlines that the current rental rates are too high in order to be favorable for the 
profitability. Many of the farmers point out that it is important with a reasonable rental rate 
based on the geographical location. Price and reasonable profitability are usually taken into 
consideration when they are extending the farm operation through tenancy arrangements. 
Farmer F attempts to develop the tenancies agreements with other enterprises than crops to 
improve the profitability. Furthermore, farmer G and F are satisfied with their current 
arrangements and are not searching to expand their business with more contracts.  
 
Would like to have made any changes if the business starts over 
Both farmer A and F would have focused more on the understanding and development of the 
arrangements. One of the farmers would have prioritized more written contracts, and the other 
one would have used more support from the consultants in order to develop complete 
agreements. One farmer believes that they would have been less price sensitive if they would 
have started the business from the beginning. Farmer D would have liked to renegotiate the 
arrangement in order to be allowed to use digested sludge. If there would have been an 
additional knowledge concerning the high level of rental rates farmer E might have bought 
more farmland.   
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Future aspects of the rental rates 
The majority of the young tenants predict that the rental rates will decrease in the future. 
Some of them point out that changes in the agricultural policies, such as the reduction of the 
area-based support payment will affect the rental rates. Rental rates should be decreasing 
given the relation to the current level of profitability, otherwise, no one wants to be a farmer.  
 
The external environment  
Some things in the near environment that affects the decisions for the future? 
Three of the farmers points out that the family affects future decisions and that there is a need 
for balance so that the farm business does not affect family life negatively. Farmer D states, 
that even if the family relations have affected the situation, the business is still goal-oriented. 
Other businesses in the agricultural sector inspires one farmer.. Furthermore, one points out 
that the future decisions are based on the grain prices and the level of area-based support. 
Farmer G emphasizes that expansion through tenancy agreements requires more employees 
and that might be a problem since they can be hard to find.  
 
Effects due to change in the agricultural policies 
Changes in the agricultural systems would affect the tenancy situation. It might have been 
better without the area-based support. But now since it exists, there is a need for it stresses 
some of the farmers. The business is dependent on the support to provide a reasonable 
income. Farmer D points out that the business climate in Sweden would change if the policies 
change. It is essenital to make the consumers more aware of what they are buying and to 
advocate conventional Swedish products ahead of for example organic products from Brazil.  
 
The future competitiveness 
Most of the respondents believe that they have a good future and produce unique products 
that make them competitive. Farmer B does not own any farmland but has machinery capacity 
that provides the business with high efficiency. A good reputation and a balance in the 
business with other sources of income apart from crops is according to farmer D important. 
Farmer C believes on the other hand that the family business provides an advantage for 
developing the farm business. Another farmer emphasizes that the agricultural sector faces a 
good future, and if you make it through you will survive. The last farmer stresses that owning 
farmland is positive for the competitiveness. The farm does not operate so much owned 
farmland so it is important to show good economic results with the tenancy agreements. 
 
What affects the rental rates 
One farmer points out that the low-interest rates trigger an increase in the rental rates. Some 
of the other farmers stress that changes in the area-based support payment and the grain 
prices, as well as the profitability of sugar beets may be factors that affect the prices for 
farmland and rental rates.   
 
Advantages and disadvantages for a young farmer  
The majority of the farmers believe that it is an advantage to be a young farmer in the 
agricultural sector. Furthermore, all of the young farmers believe that tenancy agreements are 
a good way to start and that it is easier to terminate tenancy contracts compared to purchased 
farmland, where the capital is fixed. Another advantage for young farmers are that they have  
a different working spirit with more energy, and they dare to go their own way. Many 
stakeholders have a belief in young farmers and want to provide support in different 
circumstances. Furthermore, one farmer claims that with experience, it is easier to obtain 
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credits from the bank for a tenancy contract instead of purchasing farmland. Even though, it is 
easier to get access to a tenancy contract, but it also contains a risk since you are not a part of 
the price development as for owned farmland. A disadvantage as a young farmer is their lack 
of experience. It is useful to learn from older farmers and further, develop the skills, and not 
to continue with old procedures. It is important to go your own way and believe in yourself. 
There are cases where the farmers may not further carefully examine the profitability for the 
tenancy contract. They accept the high prices, which increases the rental rate. One farm points 
out that it is preferable to calculate and accept reasonable prices instead.  
 
Some landowners do not have the same reliance on young farmers. They have a strong trust 
on humans their own age. Different generations have different ways of thinking. Machinery is 
of varying quality today, which older landowners do not understand. They believe you have to 
buy new machinery more often, but the machinery lasts longer and looks like new for an 
extended period. Lastly, it is important to be flexible. You still need to have a good reputation 
as a young farmer, maintain control over payments and the farmland. Those qualities are more 
of a priority than the age. 
 
Advidces to other young farmers 
Table 9: Experiences and advices to other young farmers that want to enter farming through tenancy 
A - Build the farm business from the tenancies and show the bank how you can succeed. If you do not have access 
to wealth from home, you have to build the operation by your self 
- Not making +/-0 calculation, is not creating any capital 
 
B - Dare, and not wait too, in order to come somewhere. Try with openness 
- Earn some other money and from the farm business in order to have balance in the economy during the year.  
- Do what you are good at and get help with the rest. 
 
C - Not be too economic aggressive. Be more pessimistic when calculating the economy. 
- Work outside the farm business in order to expand the area gradually 
 
D - Be proper, save money and fight for the farm business 
- Have the right contacts and dare to venture 
- Create a name with a good reputation and believe in what you are doing 
 
E - Analyze the situation before entering a tenancy contract, many farmers that enter bad agreements 
- Use the network and talk to them that you value 
- Have a balance with work gradually, the farm business is also your lifestyle  
 
F - Get help with the contract writing, get it right from the beginning, especially with the legislation 
- Many calculate on the highest crop of yields, better to calculate the average yield.  
 
G - Get results and keep the debts low in order to have the possibility to purchase and if there an opportunity 
emerges.  
- Have a small permanent property instead of buying too much machinery, better security 
 
H - Be innovative and find an unique business orientation 
- Contacts are important, find alternative distribution channels 
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5.3 The external actors perspective 
 
Overview of the external actors 
All actors in the study rely on young farmers but many times it depends on the situation and, 
it is usually no different from other business relationships. The private landowner often offers 
a low rental rate which indirectly makes it easier for young farmers. Although, they do not 
have any specific policy to facilitate entry into the agricultural sector for the young farmers. 
The consulting firm states that they offer many services to young farmers and that it is 
important to understand them, both practically and theoretically. There are no special 
arrangements for young farmers of the institutional landowner or the bank.  
 
Furthermore, the private landowner emphasizes the importance of creating suitable conditions 
for the new generation to be able to enter farming. The bank stresses the interest of having 
young farmers as customers. They do not have any organized strategies, but this could be a 
motivation towards facilitating entry for young farmers. The consulting firm often provides 
some educational courses and information meetings concerning intergenerational transfers.  
 
There are many things to take into consideration when choosing a tenant. When the 
institutional landowner chooses a young farmer or a new tenant, they think in general of a 
long-term perspective. The institutional landowner follows the institutional regulation in order 
achieve the highest possible long-term return. The private landowner emphasizes the 
importance of creating good conditions for the new generation to enter the agricultural sector. 
The tenancy specialist stresses that it is important to learn from each other and that it is 
important to be updated with a good network.  
 
Many of the external actors’ point out that capital will continue to be a problem since the 
agricultural sector is capital intensive. There will be an even more pronounced need for 
education, networking, and motivation. It is a complex situation. In the future, there will be a 
changing demand for food. It is substantially easier to enter the agricultural sector in order to 
get access to capital through your own property rather than just tenancy arrangements.  
 
The private landowner believes that the greatest difficulty task young farmers’ faces when 
entering a tenancy agreement is the limited capital. One advantage for young farmers is 
having a good education and a genuine interest in farming and at the same time possess 
innovative ideas (institutional landowner). The bank perceives capital access and the 
profitability level as a big problem. To enter the market and search for possibilities may be 
hard with high rental rates. Apart from capital, there are many possibilities to create a 
business. The consulting firm believes that some landowners may be skeptical about the 
individual’s lack of knowledge and that might be an obstacle for young farmers. Young 
farmers, on the other hand, view their personal capacities as a possibility of success. 
 
In the past, it was probably easier to enter farming through tenancy agreement. Transferring 
tenancy contracts within the family were common before. Another farmer says that there is a 
high demand for the agreement, and that more tenancies will be available in the future. The 
economic margins today are lower, and it is necessary for the farmers to act strategically in 
their businesses.   
38 
 
Table 10: The common questions for the external actors 
External actor A
Private landowner
External actor B
Institutional landowner
External actor C
The consulting firm
External actor D
The Bank
External 
factors 
influencing 
decisions 
Not affected by the 
external factors 
No affection, they have 
another purposes with 
their business 
Constantly develop and 
improve satisfaction for 
the customer 
 Have to acclimatize 
by the affection
Difficulties 
and 
opportunities 
for young 
farmers 
- Limited access 
to capital
+ Dedicated and driven
- Limited access 
to capital
+ Innovative and usually 
interesting ideas 
-  Landowners are 
doubtful to 
unknown people
+ Take more risks and
 be educated 
- Capital intensive and 
low profitability
+ Several possibilities 
Changed 
conditions 
over time 
Easier to receive 
tenancies before
More difficult, less 
security today
More difficult because
 of smaller margins 
The rental rates, 
larger impact on the 
landowners today
Further 
ambitions for 
young farmers
No specific, a positive 
attitude towards them
Limited opportunities, 
because of the 
organization 
More network No specific strategy to 
facilitate
Future 
conditions for 
young farmers 
Might be difficult to 
enter farming 
Capital requires, difficult 
to enter farming 
More education 
will be required
More education 
will be required 
Trust for 
young farmers
High trust for 
the young farmers
Not possible to 
generalize
High trust, important to 
understand them
Same trust to all 
customers
Arrangements 
to faciliate for 
young farmers
Have low rental rate on 
the farmland
Nothing specific at the 
moment
Meetings for the 
transferor and the 
receiver part 
Decisions are affected 
by the management 
within the bank
 
 
 External actor A - Private Landowner 
 
The private landowner has some young farmers that are below the age of 40, though most of 
them are between 50-60 years old. Furthermore, they have both conventional and organic 
producers, even if the owner would like to have more organic farmers. Their expectation upon 
a tenant is that they follow the standard arrangements. They do not have any specific 
preparations before contract writing. The private landowner makes the arrangements with 
smaller farms by themselves while with larger arrangements they organize a meeting with a 
tenancy specialist from the consulting firm. They consider that it is safer to rely on advice 
with larger arrangements, so everything is correct and follows the legislation. The tenancy 
specialist has also participated in the negotiations to contribute with legal insights.  
 
Usually, they have a good relationship with the tenants through the most problematic 
relationship is to those who have a small tenancy arrangement because they intend to argue 
more concerning the rental rates. In the recent years, the private landowner has increased the 
rental rates because it has been too low for a longer time. Furthermore, have this caused that 
some of the tenants to react and express their dissatisfaction. It is a distinct difference 
regarding larger tenants because they are more of a business operator and are more 
knowledgeable. Therefore, they accept the rental rate. Furthermore, the communication varies 
where, some have more contacts and connections than others. The most important aspect they 
consider with new tenants is the possibility to pay the rent and that they are organized. It is an 
advantage for the private landowner to have already existing tenants for new arrangements, 
assumed that they have a good relationship.  
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They offer both farm tenancies and side tenancies where the arrangements usually are five 
years. Although, they even grant contracts that are ten years, one year and less than a year. 
The reason to apply a one year contract or less is usually related to smaller farms or that that 
the tenant soon will retire. The ten-year contract is mostly applied to farm tenancies because 
they are more likely to enable larger investments if they are guaranteed the arrangements for a 
longer period of time. Though usually, it is on the tenant’s request to sign a longer 
arrangement.  
 
They usually do not follow-up on their tenants, they observe their tillable land from time to 
time and always before negotiations. The private landowner uses tenancy inspection before 
access and after the exit of the tenancy. They also conduct some inspections during long 
tenancy contracts. The reason to use inspection is to obtain an overview and knowledge of 
their leases. As a landowner, you have an opportunity and a responsibility to follow-up on the 
contracts. Their reasons to terminate an arrangement are mostly due to negligence and not 
paying in time. The private landowner is deeply affected by the laws and regulations 
concerning tenancy agreements, and therefore they use a tenancy specialist.  
 
Furthermore, they exchange experiences with other actors within the sector and, they are 
affected by the interest rate from the bank. They believe that the rental rates will decrease in 
the future because the profitability is low within the agricultural sector where most of the 
rental rates are quite high today. However, the private landowner has no opportunity to 
decrease their rental rates since they just have increased them recently because they have been 
too low in the past. Nevertheless, they could still be considered low. Young farmers do not 
have as much experience, which they have to improve. The most important factor is that they 
are willing to work and be motivated. Other advantageous for young farmers is that there 
exists a need for the younger generation in a long-term perspective within the sector. They 
also contribute with new and creative ideas.  
 
 External actor B - Institutional landowner  
 
The institutional landowner has some young farmers as tenants. Some of the tenants are under 
the age of 40, but the dominant part is between 50 to 65 years old. This situation mostly 
depends on that it takes some time to enter a stable and successful business. Most of the 
young farmers have received the tenancy contract within the family. The choice of tenants is 
mainly based on the institutional regulations. Although, it may not necessarily be the highest 
bid that is granted the tenancy contract. The landowner values more long-term relationships 
and that it should be a suitable and competent tenant.  
 
Furthermore, a too high tenancy bid can create uncertainty because it is not realistic and 
therefore that tenant is not selected. The institutional landowner offers both farm tenancies 
and side tenancies where the arrangements usually last for five years. They want long 
arrangements because they have a 1000 years perspective which implies long-term and good 
relation arrangements to their tenants. This circumstance means that their tenants have 
protection to continue with their tenancy because the contract is beyond one year. Sometimes 
they have a one-year contract if there is a new tenant to have a chance to create a relationship 
before starting a long-term arrangement. The reason could be that they have  limited 
knowledge about them or faces exploitation in the area.  
 
The relation to the tenants varies, they have more contact with some of them. Usually, they 
have more connection with the farm tenancies compared to side tenancies, since they usually 
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do larger investments. For this reason, more follow-up is needed for the farm tenancies. The 
institutional landowner is affected by the laws concerning tenancy arrangements since their 
entire work is based on the regulations. In the recent years, the agricultural sector has been 
exposed to reduced profitability due to low grain prices. Therefore, they have observed that 
the tenants usually strive to reduce the rental rates despite the facts that property prices have 
increased which should lead to increased rental rate. 
 
Furthermore, is it difficult to speculate what the rental rates will be in the future. Although, 
they have noticed that there still exist bids at high levels of rental rates, even if the 
developments are not as significant as before. The administrators’ personal reflection of what 
young farmers have to develop to be more competitive is that they have to build up a business 
slowly by working outside the business. This advice is important at least in the beginning of 
the business in order to accumulate capital and then be able to invest. Everything is centered 
around a long-term perspective. It is not realistic to go from 0 to 1000 hectares in a short 
period of time. To develop a successful business, it is important to be willing to operate the 
business and have an entrepreneurial spirit. 
 
 External actor C - Consulting firm 
 
The consulting firm has a mixed age distribution of customers. To be competitive, it is 
attractive to have young customers. It is important to develop active marketing strategies in 
order to maintain network and a level of trust. The prices for farmland and tenancies affect the 
consulting for tenancies. The reason is that higher rental rates enhance the importance of 
discussing reasonable prices and to provide well-reasoned options for the farmers. An already 
established farmer can usually offer a higher bid for a side tenancy and therefore be more 
competitive, than a newly established farmer.  
 
If the grain prices increase, it will become easier to pay a higher price of the rental rates. At 
the same time, it would be favorable if the area-based support payment displays a correlation 
with the rental rates. If there is something that one part in the tenancy relationship wants to 
change for the coming tenancy period, there will be a need for reasonable motivation to get 
the argument accepted from the landowner. It is common that the tenant and the landowner 
monitor different interests. Hence, a request for renegotiation of conditions is the only way for 
reaching potential changes in the agreement. Young farmers are sometimes more prone to 
require better conditions in the contracts. Vaguely written contracts may result in negative 
consequences. It is desirable that the landowner and the tenant put effort into their 
relationship and that they are open with each other.  
 
When consulting in a tenancy relationship, it is important to show neutrality and to be 
competent concerning the potential questions. It is critical to provide guidance without 
advocating any side of the relationship so the parties can make their own choices. The 
important aspect is to be aware when protection of the tenancies is included in the contracts. 
When formulating an application for a tenancy it is important to not only present the rental 
rates. It is also essential to describe who you are, what kind of education you have (both 
theoretical and practical). Furthermore, to create an advantage, it should include what 
interests you have and how the business plan is structured. Finally, it is positive to be able to 
reveal references from the bank or employer to the landowner in order to give additional 
information. It is essential to make a good application and to explain why the landowner 
should choose the potential tenant.  
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Education is becoming more important to be competitive as a tenant. In order to develop a 
long-term relationship with a tenant and landowner. It is good to build faith and trust to 
understand the other party. Sometimes some parties are disagreeing. It is better to ask one 
time too much and show some gratitude instead of just acting based upon self- interest in such 
a relationship. Many farmers ask questions about the tenancy legislation where the law can 
sometimes be difficult to understand.  
 
The agricultural sector is complex and capital intensive. In the future, we have to be 
innovative and produce other crops and products. The young generation today sees more 
possibilities to develop agriculture in a new direction. To think more businesslike and focus 
on the main business it is necessary to invest in the services that can be important for the farm 
business. It is significant to analyze the farm business and learn from your own mistakes in 
order to be competitive.  
 
 External actor D - Bank 
 
With the current prices for farmland and agricultural tenancies, the bank is more careful. The 
farmers need to motivate why and how they can pay the specific prices. In order to be 
convinced they have to show the whole farm budget and argue how it is practically workable.  
The bank expects that the farmer performs what they say they will perform. Young farmers 
are proactive and creative. If there is something that does not work out good, they find other 
solutions to perform and earn money. It is mostly about being entrepreneurial. In order to 
provide credits, it is important to find repayment abilities. It is essential to allocate time to the 
business idea and to be aware of liquidity issues. Long-term thinking and planning repayment 
of loans is essential. Many farmers are very competent with full control and update their 
knowledge continuously. It is positive to be on the frontier that shows that you are thinking 
and are a planning entrepreneur. Every young farmer does not have the same preconditions. 
As a young farmer, it is hard to take all initiatives at the same time, and it is better to develop 
gradually. Growing with profitability is important. 
 
In order to achieve a long-term relationship as a tenant, it is necessary to maintain a good 
relationship with the landowner. The landowner will be satisfied if the farmland is managed 
in a good way. It is better to not enter a tenancy agreement with a too high rental rate in order 
to maintain a viable business. The landowner is usually business-oriented and has well- 
defined goals concerning profits margins.   
 
The bank does not only focus on the agricultural sector in order to secure collateral. It is also, 
for example, other businesses and properties as well as the private sector. In order to be 
continuously updated it is necessary to have a network with other banks. They discuss the 
different directions in the agricultural sector in order to give good advice. When farmers reach 
the age of 60, they may be asked their thoughts concerning transferring the farm business in 
the future. Otherwise, there are no restrictions concerning the age, more about how they plan 
their business.  
 
The advantage of a tenancy agreement is that it is easier to enter and exit the agreement 
compared to purchased farmland. It is also easier to expand with tenancy arrangements since 
you do not invest the same amount of capital. On the other hand, if you do not own property, 
you need to build capital continously in another way as a tenant. There can be some bad years 
as a tenant, and it may result in reduced economic results. Then it can be good to have other 
income streams in order to maintain an economic balance in the business. 
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6 Analysis and discussion 
Following chapter analyzes the theoretical framework and the linkages to the empirical data. 
The analysis is followed by a discussion of the findings. 
 
6.1 The principal-agent in a tenancy relationship 
 
The principal-agent theory is based on a principal that have a contract arrangement with an 
agent (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2014; Royer, 1999). This is similar to the relationship between a 
landowner and tenant. The relation between the landowner and the tenant could be related to 
the principal-agent problem, where an action affects the other part. (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 
2014; Royer, 1999). The relationship between the landowner and the tenant varies depending 
on their previous experiences (Grossman, 1992). If a farmer does not have previously related 
relationship to the landowner, it is important to make a good application for the potential 
tenancy arrangements in order to achieve them. In this study, most of the farmers have good 
relationship and communication with their landowners. Although, some of the farmers 
emphasize that the relationship to their landowner is not always positive. The reason is mainly 
due to landowners opportunistic trait, for example, charging a high rental rate.  
 
The principal-agent relationship may result that one part has an advantage over the other part 
(Royer, 1999). One example is that the landowner can decide the level of rental rate, which 
most of the farmers in this study indicates are too high and thereby affects their profitability. 
Furthermore, a high rental rate is difficult to negotiate because if the tenant does not accept 
the price the landowner can choose another part before or after the contract is signed. 
Therefore, the landowner might have an advantage over the tenant in this business 
relationship. Although, if the tenant has a protected tenancy, they are secured by the tenancy 
legislation. A protected tenancy incorporates automatically when a tenancy arrangement is 
beyond one year. One of the most significant empirical findings is that good reputation and 
relationship with the landowner is necessary in order to enter a tenancy arrangement. The 
reason is that none of the farmers in this study has received a tenancy contract on the open 
market. Most of the farmers have received their tenancy arrangements through good 
relationship and networking. However, the tenant has the opportunity to avoid high rental rate 
by not accepting these arrangements. On the other hand, one farmer highlights that the 
demand for farmland has increased and therefore there may be limited access to arable land in 
some regions. High rental rates of farmland could be explained by the supply and demand 
issue. Therefore, many young farmers must accept these high rental rates in order to be able to 
achieve a tenancy arrangement.  
 
 Adverse Selection 
 
Adverse selection may occur through information asymmetry before signing an agreement 
between two parties in a business relationship (Groenewegen et al., 2010). The principal and 
the agent are heterogeneous since they have different intentions (Fraser, 2015). The agent 
prefers to behave according to their satisfaction, which might not correspond to the 
landowner’s satisfaction. One farmer emphasizes that the tenancy arrangement has not 
developed as expected. This is mainly due to the design of the contract. It can be useful to 
organize complete contracts in order to minimize information asymmetry. This is aslo a 
recommendation from the tenancy specialist from the consulting firm. 
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The adverse selection can be compared with the insurance market. There can be an increased 
risk with new customers since the lack of previous knowledge about them (Groweningen et 
al., 2010). This example can be compared to the agreement between a landowner and a tenant 
since both parties may have a lack of information about each other. The empirical data 
indicates that most of the farmers had a good relationship with the landowners before they 
entered the tenancy arrangements. The good relationship has reduced the information 
asymmetry since both parties have had personal knowledge to each other in advance. 
Furthermore, a tenancy arrangement may have different levels of risk (Groenewegen et al., 
2010). The landowner can be responsible for some actions within the tenancy contract. This 
may, for example, be to maintaining the agricultural buildings or arable land. These 
agreements may result in different levels of risks since there can be a lack of information and 
it is also difficult to predict unexpected situations. According to the farmers in the study, a 
well-established relationship before the contract is signed usually result in lower risk.  
 
 Moral Hazard 
 
Moral Hazard problems may arise after a contract has been signed (Groenewegen et al., 
2010). This can be when one part changes their behavior without the other part knowing in 
the business relationship. This phenomenon can also be called ex-post opportunism. The 
reason to change behavior is usually related to maximizing their own satisfaction. Some 
farmers in the study claim that it has been more difficult than expected with the tenancy 
arrangements. One reason is due to the decrease of profitability in the agricultural sector in 
general, which can cause financial stress to farmers. The reason for the lower profitability in 
the agricultural sector is mainly because of the high rental rates. The rental rates have 
previously increased but in the recent years they have stagnated at a high level. At the same 
time the grain prices have decreased and the area based support payment have been reduced. 
Those circumstances make it more difficult for new farmers to enter the agricultural sector. 
 
The young farmers in the study believed that the landowner should have a better 
understanding of the farmer's circumstances since most of them have been active in the 
agricultural sector by themselves. The young farmers assumed that the landowners would 
have followed the price developments within the agricultural sector in order to improve the 
conditions for the tenant. Although, according to Amis (1984) some landowners have more 
sympathy than others, there is no systematic explanation since it depends on different 
circumstances. However, according to the study, it is usually impossible for the young tenants 
to renegotiate the rental rate in the contract arrangements.   
  
 Information asymmetry 
 
Asymmetric information arises from hidden information, which can lead to extra transaction 
costs in the relationship (Wilson, 2008). According to the empirics in the study, one farmer 
points out that some landowners have an open dialogue about the arrangement to their 
tenants, while some have hidden information for their tenants. This information could, for 
example, be about the occurrence of wild oats and black-grass that is of significant 
importance to be aware of in a tenancy arrangement. According to Royer (1999), the 
information asymmetry is usually common in the principal-agent relationship. Farm E argues 
that it is better to have an open relationship with the landowner and discuss the agreement 
before signing the contract since it becomes easier to deal with as opposed to when a problem 
emerges later on.  
 
44 
 
The principal-agent problem can occur in any situation, which therefore increases the risk of 
asymmetric information (Groenewegen et al., 2010). Although, there can be actions that can 
minimize those levels of risks and improve the relationship between the parties. The 
agreements in a tenancy contract may have a significant influence on the relationship between 
the landowner and the tenant. In this study, the farmers’ use different preparations for the 
contract writing. Some of the farmers have used already existing contracts, and some have 
used support from a consulting firm. Most of the farmers emphasize that it is a good 
investment to obtain support for arranging contracts. The reason is to avoid a lack of 
information between the landowner and the tenant and thereby create a better trust in the 
relationship. Even the private landowner’s claims that it is beneficial to use support in the 
contract writing process.  
 
 Transaction costs 
 
Transaction costs may arise when negotiating and enforcing contracts and where at least on 
part acts opportunistically (Royer, 1999). In line with the empirics, farmer’s involvement in a 
tenancy agreement process varies. Some farmers rely on oral contracts, which the tenancy 
specialist from the consulting firm does not recommend. It is problematic since it provides 
limited evidence on the terms of the agreement. Other farmers use or reformulate previous 
contracts. To use oral and reformulated contracts are associated with a higher risk since they 
might not be complete contracts. A complete contract is necessary to avoid the opportunistic 
behavior. One farm regrets that they did not use a consulting firm that constructed and 
organized the tenancy agreement. The main reason for this has been that the landowner 
arranged the contract for their satisfaction. The result of this procedure caused a transaction 
cost due to opportunistic behavior arose. It is important to be active concerning the contract 
writing process and to use complete contracts in order to avoid opportunistic behavior in the 
contract relationship (Royer, 1999).  
 
Transaction costs can arise both from the consequences of opportunistic behavior and actions 
of trying to prevent it (Royer, 1999). The private landowner, emphasizes the importance of 
using support from a tenancy specialist during the negotiating period. The reason is to 
facilitate the arrangements and promote a better understanding of the tenancy legislation, 
which is a way to prevent transaction costs from arising. Farm D emphasize the importance of 
discussing all potential situations that might occur during the arrangement with the 
landowner. This discussion should be held during the parties’ first meeting or some other time 
before signing the contract. The reason is that it facilitates if some problem arises later on 
since it is supported in the arrangement.  
 
 Portfolio problem 
 
The portfolio problem can occur when an investor has different risk preferences with 
restricted capital (Cook, 1995; Andersson, 2014). The agricultural sector is capital intensive, 
and therefore it is necessary to spread the risks of the restricted capital in different portfolios 
(Johanson et al., 2014; Wålstedt, 1987). However, this sector experiences substantial price 
fluctuations and thereby affects the opportunities to invest in the future. In line with the 
empirical findings, farmer G emphasize the importance of having several tenancy 
relationships instead of having one larger contract. To have a diversified portfolio by using 
several contracts, it increases the business resilience if a contract would be terminated. 
Another empirical finding indicates that is preferable to divide the business portfolio into 
different business areas, for example, combine a tenancy arrangement by owning arable land 
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or to operate a side business (Andersson, 2014). Owning arable land increases the possibility 
to obtain credit from lending institutions and other financiers. 
 
 Horizon problem 
 
The horizon problem arises when an investor claims that the net cash flow from the asset is 
predicted to end before the asset’s economic lifespan has ended (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999). 
This phenomenon relates to the length of the tenancy arrangement because there is no 
guarantee that the arrangement lasts in a long-term perspective (Fraser, 2015). It is, therefore, 
necessary to maximize the business results in short-term perspective. The interviewed farmers 
contract length varies in the study. The range is between eleven months and five years. Some 
farmers believe it is an advantage to have contracts beyond one year because of increased 
security for the tenant. The reason is due to protected tenancy legislation. Furthermore, more 
extended contracts contribute to the ability for long-term strategic planning.   
 
A consequence of the horizon problem is that the actors face a reduced planning horizon 
(Royer, 1999; Ortmann & King, 2007). They may, therefore, underinvest since they are 
unsure about the future. It also inhibits the possibility of business growth (Cook, 1995). Most 
of the farmers point out that a tenancy beyond a year increases the ability to invest and 
thereby enhances the growth. Additionally, this is something both private and institutional 
landowner have noticed. Although, some farmers consider that even a one-year contract might 
contribute to long-term security. This is because they have had a good relationship with the 
landowner and that they kept the tenancy for a long time. Farmer H claims that it is always a 
disadvantage with tenancies since it is not owned property and therefore more insecure.  
 
 Hold- up problem 
 
Hold- up problem occurs when one part in the business relationship might act 
opportunistically and use this position with bargaining power (Royer, 1999). This example is 
a type of incomplete contract where there is a lack of trust. This relates to one of the farmer’s 
experiences where the landowner in the relationship created their arrangement and thereby 
used the bargaining power. The problem with power advantageous may increase the 
transaction costs and can also create difficulties for renegotiations (Royer, 1999). Another 
empirical connection is that some farmers have one-year agreements and therefore usually 
have limited planning horizon in the relationship between the landowner and the tenant. The 
reason is because the agreement can be terminated at any time by the landowner.  
 
6.2 The stakeholders in a tenancy relationship 
 
The definition of a stakeholder is individuals or groups who have the opportunity to affect or 
be affected by the accomplishment of organizational objectives (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
Most of the farmers emphasize that they have been affected by the government intervention, 
in the form of laws and regulations, in order to enter a farm business through tenancy. The 
government has affected the farmers by the implementation of area-based support payment. 
This has caused increasing rental rates for farmland. Some of the farmers believe that the 
agricultural sector would have been better off without the implementation of the support 
payment since it is common that farmers now are dependent on it. Furthermore, some farmers 
point out that laws and regulations always limit their flexibility and it will probably not be 
easier in the future.  
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Young farmers under 40 years old have the opportunity to obtain investment support for 
newly established business within the agricultural sector. One farmer mentioned that this 
support is valuable, but it is very important to receive it at the right time. Another 
consequence of the regulations is that it is time-consuming because of the complexity in the 
law. Some usually request support from experts to assure legal compliance in the agricultural 
sector.  
 
The stakeholder theory stresses the importance of creating an honest and truthful relationship 
with the external actors (Wagner Mainardes, 2011). This is because the external actors have a 
major impact on the development and success of the business. Furthermore, social capital is 
referred to as the value of connection and trust between involved parties (Pretty, 2003). Social 
capital reduces the transaction costs between the parties since they have to trust each other 
and therefore it is not necessary to monitor each other (Pretty & Ward, 2001; Pretty, 2003).  
Most of the farmers consider that external actors have a good trust in young farmers since 
they believe in them and they want to provide full support. Although, one farmer points out 
that usually external actors state that they have trust in young farmers. However, on the other 
hand, in the reality, they do not have trust since they do not want to take high risks. Some 
farmers emphasize that the reliance on young farmers depend on the external actors and 
honesty could generate higher trust. On the other hand, the majority of the farmers have a 
good trust in external actors. Furthermore, one farmer claim that high trust to external actors 
can lead to long-term relationships.  
 
Some stakeholders are more valuable than others and therefore could be considered to be a 
key stakeholder (Freeman, 2010). Furthermore, both primary and secondary stakeholders 
exist. Primary stakeholders are more inclined to promote a formal relationship through 
contracts while secondary is less formal (Wagner Mainardes, 2011). According to two 
farmers, the bank is the most important stakeholder since the farmers would not be able to 
enter and continue their business without the financial support. In order to obtain credits from 
the bank it is important to create an honest and truthful relationship. However, they also need 
to believe in what they are doing and show the bank how they can succeed. One farmer 
emphasizes that the most important stakeholder is the landowner because without them they 
would not have any farmland. Therefore, it is necessary for young farmers to create a good 
reputation and maintain a network in the sector. Some farmers value good employees since 
they have a major effect on the business. Other important external actors are consulting firms 
and family members. Bank, landowner, employees and consulting firms are considered to be 
primary stakeholders since they are more formal and usually prefer to maintain contracts.  
 
6.3 Discussion 
 
A good relationship between the landowner and the tenant is important in order to achieve a 
stable tenancy agreement. Usually, it depends on the social context and the unique situation.  
It is beneficial to have a good relationship before entering a tenancy agreement since this may 
facilitate effective collaboration. In a principal-agent relationship, a problem may arise 
because of acts of self-interest (Fraser, 2015). As the empirics and the analysis indicate, the 
rental rate is a sensitive topic. Generally, the landowner wants a high price to enhance 
economic returns, while the tenant seeks a lower level in order to maximize their profit. 
Hence, the principal-agent phenomenon is not a one-way issue since it arises both from the 
landowner and the tenant. This is explained by their desire of maximizing utility.  
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Lack of information may arise in combination with contracts arrangements. Complete 
contracts are essential to minimize the risks of hidden information in the contract relationship. 
The arrangements may contain different levels of risks since it is difficult to predict 
unexpected situations. It is good to have an open and good relationship between the 
landowner and the tenant before the agreement begins to minimize the lack of information. 
Furthermore, it is also necessary to continue with the communication during the current 
arrangement. Asymmetric information that occurs in combination with the agreement might 
develop an opportunistic behavior after the contract has been signed (Groenewegen et al., 
2010). This changing behavior can lead to unnecessary transactions costs. One way to prevent 
these situations is to use complete and written contracts. Therefore, incomplete and oral 
contracts are not recommended. To be well prepared and have knowledge within the area of 
tenancy agreements it is preferable to promote a long-term relationship. Constructing and 
organizing arrangements through a consulting firm can be a solution to develop more 
complete contracts where all the parties become satisfied. Tenancy inspections is another 
monitoring mechanism that both parties can use. This can be used before entry, during the 
agreement period and for the exit of the tenancy contract. Using a tenancy inspection 
confirms the current conditions of the tenancy agreement and therefore minimizes the risk of 
having a lack of information between the parties.  
 
The agricultural sector is very capital intensive, and therefore it is necessary to have a suitable 
structure in the farm business (Johanson et al., 2014; Wålstedt, 1987). With a tenancy 
arrangement, it is essential to distribute the risks to maintain a balanced and competitive farm 
business. Therefore, it can be important to operate several arrangements with different 
landowners in order to not be dependent on one contract. Other alternatives for spreading the 
risks is to have a side business or to own some tillable land. Furthermore, owning land is an 
important quality measurement from the bank’s credit perspective.  
 
The contract length may decrease the investment incentives since it affects the planning 
horizon of the assets. Tenancy arrangement is not owned property and therefore is the tenant 
not part of the price developments. More extended contracts provide the possibility to 
acclimatize the business in a more long-term perspective. Although, the empirical findings 
indicate that a one-year arrangement does not necessarily need to be a short-term contract. 
This is based on a good relationship between the landowner and the tenant. Sometimes the 
landowner may have bargaining power, and therefore it can be difficult for the tenant to 
renegotiate the arrangements. Landowners have the advantage to decide how to arrange the 
contracts. This may, for example, relate to only allowing organic farming or other agricultural 
practices.  
 
Stakeholders are relevant since they affect the development of the farm business. Therefore, 
an honest and trustful relationship is important (Wagner Mainardes, 2011). This relates to the 
social capital that determines the value of the connection and trust for the parties in a 
relationship. Social capital decreases the transaction costs since it limits the need for 
monitoring the parties’ trustworthiness. The study indicates that external actors usually have 
trust in young farmers. Although, sometimes the external actors indicate that they have trust, 
but in reality, they do not. This is a major issue for the young farmers since they always have 
to improve and show legitimacy towards the external actors. Furthermore, some stakeholders 
are more important than others.  
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The empirical data reveals that the most important stakeholders for young tenants are the 
bank, landowners, employees, consulting firms and family members. The bank is important in 
order to gain access to capital. The landowner is a crucial actor as they provide arable land to 
farmers. The employees are significant because it would not be possible to operate a larger 
business without them. The consulting firm is useful in the process of making tenancy 
arrangements since they contribute with valuable expertise. Family members are necessary 
because of their daily support. Conclusively, all external actors are in combination essential to 
develop young farmers businesses. Good reputation, and a willingness to develop good 
relationships with the stakeholders is valuable to maintain a stable and trustworthy business.   
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7 Conclusions and future research  
The final chapter include the conclusions and ends with possible future research. The aim of 
the study is to increase the understanding of young farmers’ opportunities to enter and 
maintain farming through tenancy agreements. With the analysis as a basis, this chapter aims 
to answer following research questions that were presented in chapter one. 
 
- How does the relationship to the landowners influence the young farmers’ opportunity to 
enter and maintain a tenancy agreement?  
- How do the external actors affect young tenant farmers’ business conditions within the 
agricultural sector? 
7.1 Conclusions 
 
The conclusions from this study reveal that different types of relationship between the 
landowner and the tenant affects the possibility of entering farming through tenancy 
agreements. It is necessary for the young farmers to create a good relationship with the 
landowner in order to obtain and maintain a tenancy contract. Furthermore, a good reputation 
and network in the agricultural sector are essential aspects for a young farmer to take into 
consideration. In a business relationship, it is useful to have open communication and avoid 
asymmetric information in order to create an honest and stable relationship between the 
parties. If the farmer does not have any previous relationship with the landowner, it is even 
more important to submit a good application in order to achieve a tenancy arrangement.  
 
Since the agricultural sector is capital intensive, it is important for young farmers to minimize 
their risk portfolio by having tenancy relationships with different landowners. The intention is 
not to be dependent on one single agreement. The study indicates that a one-year agreement 
can be viewed as long-term arrangements if the relationship with the landowner is well-
established from the beginning.  
 
The landowners have bargaining power in a tenancy arrangement since they have the 
opportunity to decide who will enter the tenancy agreement and the frame of the contract.  
This could, for example, be organic farming or the level of the rental rate for the tenancy 
agreement. The landowners bargaining power can make it more difficult to enter and maintain 
a good relationship between the landowner and the tenant. However, some landowners value 
a good and truthful relationship to the tenant instead of achieving a high rental rate in the 
tenancy agreement. This facilitates for young farmers to enter and maintain a tenancy 
agreement since they have limited access to capital and are therefore not able to obtain 
tenancy agreements through the highest bid. Younger farmers have other conditions compared 
to well-established farmers within the sector, and therefore it is even more important to value 
good relationships with the landowner and other involved actors. 
 
The results of the study reveal that a good relationship with the external actors are essential 
since they have a significant impact on the tenants’ business. The most important external 
actors are considered to be the landowner and the financial institution. Without the 
landowners farmland it is impossible for the tenant to even maintain a tenancy arrangement. 
The financial institutions affect young farmers’ possibility to access capital. Therefore, it is 
necessary for the farmers to offer collateral in order to receive capital from the bank. 
Additionally, a consulting firm is considered to be useful since their function is to be a 
mediator between the landowner and the tenant. Their purpose is to be objective towards all 
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parties and focus on contributing with expertise and experience within the tenancy and 
agricultural context.  
 
A good relationship with landowners and external actors are considered to be the most 
important aspect for a tenant to observe. Young farmers usually experience more difficulties 
from a financial aspect because of the limited access to capital, and therefore are good 
relationships and reputation essential for the possibility to enter and maintain farming through 
tenancy. 
 
7.2 Future research 
 
Furthermore, it might be interesting for future research to analyze different geographical areas 
with different types of farms. The reason this could be interesting is that young farmers’ 
opportunity to enter a tenancy arrangement may differ depending on location and the type of 
farming system. Another possibility is to extend the future research to other regions outside 
Sweden in order to compare the differences between the countries. Another aspect to examine 
is to analyze whether purchasing or leasing farmland is the most profitable choice.  
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Appendix 1: Interview Questions – Young farmers 
 
Background questions 
1. What is your age? 
2. How long have you been interested in farming?  
3. How long have you worked in the agricultural sector? 
4. What type of education and unique work experiences do you have? 
5. What is your main business orientation? 
6. Do you run a full-time farm or combine with any other businesses?  
7. Do you run your business with someone else? 
- If yes: in what form? 
8. How much farmland do you use? - leased and owned land? 
9. When did you access your first tenancy? 
- How many hectares were your first tenancy on? 
10. When did you access your latest tenancy? 
11. How do your rental rate look like? 
- What is your highest rental rate? 
- What is your lowest rental rate? 
 
Before the enter of the tenancy 
The relationship between landowner and tenant 
12. Why did you choose to enter through tenancy? 
- What factors were crucial? 
- Why did you enter by tenancy in front of buying farmland? 
- How did the process look like before you found out to have tenancies? 
13. What do you think is the reason you got the tenancy/tenancies you have today? 
14. What was the preparation for the contract writing? 
15. What relationship did you have with the landowner/landowners prior to the 
establishment? 
- Do you feel that your relationship with the landowner/ landowners has been an 
advantage or disadvantage for your business? 
16. What expectations do you have for the tenancies? 
- How long are you expected to have your tenancy/tenancies? 
 
External actors 
17. Have you hired consulting before the contract writing? 
18. In what way have laws and guidelines affected the establishment of tenancies? 
19. How was your reliance on external actors in the sector prior to the establishment of 
tenancies? e.g. advisors, banks, landowners, government or other actors? 
20. How has the environment affected your establishment? For example, standards / 
criteria’s / requirements  
21. How do you think the bank is thinking regarding credits for young farmers? 
Current business 
The relationship between landowner and tenant  
22. Have you incorporated your expectations for the establishment with tenancies? 
- Is it like you have imagined? 
23. How do you feel that the profitability has been affected? 
- What could you develop in order to improve the profitability?  
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24. Have farmland and tenancy prices affected your business? 
25. How is your relationship with the landowner today? 
- What could you develop in order to improve the profitability?  
- How has the communication worked between you? 
- Have you experienced any risk/obstacle regarding your tenancy?  
- Do you feel that both parties comply with what has been agreed in the contract? 
26. How long tenancy agreement do you have and are you interested in extending it? 
- Has your contract duration affected your choice of tenancy? 
27. What kind of tenancies do you have, farm tenancy or side tenancy?  
28. Have there been any conflicts and conflict of interests between you as a tenant and the 
landowner? 
29. Would you be able to decline a tenancy if you were offered one today? 
30. If the tenancy does not live up to your expectations, how would you act? 
 
External actors 
31. What is the most important external relationship in your business? 
32. How do laws and regulations affect your business today? 
33. What reliance do you think external actors have against young farmers? 
34. Do you think there is an advantage or a disadvantage to be a young farmer in the 
agricultural sector? 
- Is there someone else in your environment that affected your decisions? 
35. Now afterward, do you think it was the right time for you to enter via leasing? 
 
The future with tenancies 
The relationship between landowner and tenant? 
36. What are the future prospects for your farm business? 
- Are you interested in developing tenancy? 
37. Are you willing to rent more farmland land if the opportunity is given? 
- If yes, at what price? How risk averse are you? 
- If no, why? 
38. If you had the opportunity to start over with tenancies today, would you have done 
something differently? 
39. How do you want to develop the leased farmland in the future? 
40. What do you think the future's rental prices look like? 
 
External actors 
41. Is there anyone in your environment that affects your decisions for the future? 
42. How would changes in agricultural policy affect your business? 
43. How does the future competitiveness look for your farm business?  
44. What do you think affects land and tenancy prices? 
Final questions 
45. What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of being a young farmer who 
wants to enter tenancy? 
46. Lastly, what would you like to give further to young farmers that are in the process of 
starting a business through tenancies? 
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Appendix 2 Interview Questions – External actors 
 
Background questions for all external actors  
1. How long have you been working here?  
2. What are your main tasks? 
3. How long have you worked in the agricultural sector?  
4. Do you have any agricultural affiliation before? 
5. What is your educational background?  
6. How do you experience your reliance on young farmers? 
7. Do you do anything now to make it facilitate for young farmers? 
8. What ambition do you have in your work role to facilitate young farmers? 
9. How do you think the future looks like for young farmers to be able to enter in the 
agricultural industry? 
- How many hectares was your first tenancy on? 
10. What do you think is the biggest obstacle and possibility for young farmers who wants 
to lease farmland? 
11. How have the conditions changed over time for young farmers to be able to enter 
through tenancy? 
12. How does the environment affect your decision in the advice of young farmers to have 
tenancy? 
- Are there other actors who control/influence your decisions? 
13. What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of being a young farmer who 
wants to enter through tenancy? 
14. In conclusion, what would you like to say further to young farmers who are in the 
process of starting to rent arable land 
 
Private and Institutional landowner 
1. Do you currently have any young tenants who are under 40 years old? 
2. What are your expectations for your tenants? 
3. What are the preparations for the contract writing with the tenants? 
4. When you submit multiple applications for a lease, what are the most important 
aspects to consider? 
- What is your tenancy prices based on? 
5. What type of tenancy contract do you have with your tenants? 
6. What characterize your current tenants? 
7. How is your relationship with your tenants? 
- How does the communication work between the landowner and the tenant? 
8.  How do you follow up your tenants?  
9. What are you doing today in order to facilitate young interested farmers who want to 
lease? 
10.  What could you do further in the future to facilitate young farmers? 
11.  Does it have an impact on the decision making that farmers become older?  
12.  Do you feel any pressure from the environmental surrounding for your choice of your  
tenants? 
13.  How are your decisions affected from laws and regulations? 
14.  How are you affected by other actors such landowners, advisors, banks etc.? 
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15. How do you think that the tenancy prices and prices for farmland will be developed 
over time? 
16. How is the age distribution among the tenancy applications usually? 
- Do you feel that there are many tenancy applications from young farmers? 
17. What do young farmers need to improve to stand out better and be more competitive 
on the market? 
 
Tenancy Consulting  
1. How is the age distribution for your customers? 
– How many are under 40 years old (an estimation)? 
2. How do the prices on farmland and tenancies affect the consulting? 
3. What are your expectations for young farmers in your consulting?  
4. What contractual length on tenancies do you advice?  
5. What do you do today to facilitate young farmers that are interested in renting arable 
land? 
6. How do you work with landowners and tenants (tenancy questions)? 
7. What do you think is important as a young farmer to highlight in a tenancy 
application? 
8. What do you think are the key aspects of having a successful and long-term tenancy? 
9. Do you feel that there is a lack of information between landowners and tenants in 
their communication between them? 
10.  Do you usually have a long-term relationship with your customers in connection with 
the tenancies and agreements? 
11. Regarding the follow-up. Are you following the process between the landowners and 
tenants after their contracts have been finished? 
12. How are your decisions affected by laws and policies? (e.g. Sweden’s laws or policies 
within the organization)?  
13. Do you think that young farmers have the right conditions for running and leasing a 
farm today? 
14. How can the trust in young farmers increase in the Swedish Agricultural sector? 
15. How do other actors such as landowners, advisors, and banks affect you in your 
decision-making processes? 
16. Farmers become older; does it affect your advice as a consulting firm to let the next 
generation come? 
17. How do you see the young farmers’ competitiveness in the future? 
 
Bank  
1.  How do the prices on farmland and tenancies affect the consulting at the bank? 
2. How is the age distribution among your customers at the bank? 
3. What are your expectations for young farmers in your consulting?  
4. Is there any distinction between young farmers and other customers in the 
agricultural sector? 
5. What criterions are essential for lending to young farmers? How would you be more 
secure in order to lend money to young farmers? (What do young farmers need to 
improve?) 
6. What does that bank take in consideration concerning cash flow and financial 
follow-up with the customers? 
7. What would young farmers need to improve in the future to stand out better and in 
order to be more competitive on the market 
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8. What do you think are the key aspects of having a successful and long-term 
tenancy? 
9. Do you think that young farmers have the right conditions for running and leasing a 
farm today? 
10. How are your decisions affected by laws and policies? (e.g. Sweden’s laws or 
policies within the organization)?  
11. How can the reliance on young farmers increase in the Swedish agricultural sector? 
12. How do other actors such as landowners, advisors, and banks affect you in your   
decision-making processes? 
13. That farmers become older, does that affect your decisions to allow the next 
generation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
Appendix 3 Literature review  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Previous research Subject/Title Country 
Allen & Lueck, 2002 Contracts, Risk, and 
Organization in Agriculture 
USA 
Amis, 1994 Squatters or Tenants: The 
Commercialization  
Africa 
Blaikie & Brookfield, 1987 Approaches to the study of land 
degradation 
USA 
Carter, 1998 Portfolio entrepreneurship in the 
farm sector 
United 
Kingdom 
Deininger & Feder, 2001 Land institutions and land 
markets 
USA 
Fraser, 2004 Land tenure and agricultural 
management 
 
Canada 
Grossman, 1992 Agricultural Leases: Some 
Issues in the Landlord 
USA 
Grubbström & Eriksson, 2018 Retired Farmers and New Land 
Users 
Sweden 
Hansson, et al. 2012 Psychological Constructs 
Underlying Farmers’ Decisions  
Sweden 
Reiss, 1960 Getting started and established 
in farming 
USA 
Svensson 1997 Tenancy and hunting rights Sweden 
Wästfelt, 2014 To farm but not own- tenancy 
and other access rights  
Sweden 
Andersson, 2014;  
in Wästfelt, 2014 
Tenancy structures and land 
ownership 
Sweden 
Axelsson, 2014; 
in Wästfelt, 2014 
 
Tenancy structures and land 
ownership 
Sweden 
Bäärnhielm, 2014;  
in Wästfelt, 2014 
Tenancy and agrarian policies Sweden 
Pålsson, 2014;  
in Wästfelt, 2014 
Reflections and comments on 
the agricultural resource 
statistics 
Sweden 
